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ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2006, the province of Ontario banned arbitration of family 
law disputes under any body of laws except Ontario law, in part to 
prohibit arbitration under religious laws.1  The province passed 
this legislation amidst political pressure from lobbyist groups to 
prevent the establishment of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice 
(IICJ), a religious arbitration tribunal.2  The province took this 
action despite its initial strong optimism towards religious 
arbitration of family law disputes.3  In light of the province‘s 
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School, 2012; B. Sc. Econ (Finance and Management), The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2008.  I would like to thank God, my Parents, 
Maryam, family and friends for all their support and encouragement.  I would 
also like to thank Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi for all his groundbreaking work in the UK 
that made this analysis possible, and for his time and guidance.  Errors and 
inaccuracies are entirely my own. 
1 See Almas Khan, The Interaction Between Shariah and International Law in 
Arbitration, 6 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 791, 792 (2006) (noting that Ontario Premier Dalton 
McGuinty sought to pass legislation to prevent arbitration of family law disputes 
under any law except Ontario law to prohibit religious law from being employed 
in arbitration); Eli Walker, Don’t Throw Out My Baby! Why Dalton McGuinty Was 
Wrong To Reject Religious Arbitration, 11 APPEAL REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 94, 
94 (2006) (explaining that Premier McGuinty opined that religious arbitration 
could not be part of a cohesive multicultural society and sought to end the debate 
on whether Ontario would continue to permit binding arbitration of family law 
disputes). 
2 See Walker, supra note 1, at 98 (suggesting that despite the 
recommendations by former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd to permit 
arbitration, even in the religious law context, Premier McGuinty‘s decision relied 
upon feminist critiques of multiculturalism). 
3 See Jehan Aslam, Note, Judicial Oversight of Islamic Family Law Arbitration in 
Ontario: Ensuring Meaningful Consent and Promoting Multicultural Citizenship, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 841, 842 (2006) (noting that Ontario was regarded as being 
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actions, I will argue that Ontario should permit religious 
arbitration to resolve family law disputes, based on public policy 
grounds, given the demonstrated success of the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) in England.  The MAT, a binding 
arbitration tribunal, has addressed numerous issues in England 
ranging from social and cultural integration, human rights and 
commercial activity.4  I will use the recent successes of the MAT as 
a baseline for comparison and argue that Ontario should permit 
religious arbitration because of its potential to:  (1) establish a 
religiously acceptable dispute resolution forum that is fair and 
sensitive towards gender issues; (2) establish an effective dispute 
resolution system that addresses the concerns of questionable 
voluntary submission and informed consent; (3) further integrate 
the Muslim minority into broader society; (4) enable Muslims to 
freely practice their religion in an informed and constructive 
manner; (5) increase Muslim participation in the judicial system; 
(6) create regulated judicial oversight of community dispute 
resolution that would otherwise be subject to communal 
manipulation; (7) address human rights issues that are otherwise 
unaddressed in Ontario behind the cloak of ―cultural customs;‖ (8) 
create organic solutions to address unique social problems within 
the demographic while promoting social integration; and (9) 
facilitate economic and time efficiency, while reducing the taxing 
emotional impact of adversarial litigation. 
In conducting this analysis, I will begin with a historical 
overview of the proposal for religious arbitration according to 
Islamic Law in Ontario.  I will explore the proposal‘s original legal 
 
favorable to experimenting with a formal religious arbitration system and opining 
that it was unfortunate that Premier McGuinty reversed his initial position). 
4 The MAT has played an integrative role whereby Muslims are creating 
constructive legal solutions to dispute resolution with the broader British society 
that interfaces with both Muslim and non-Muslims alike.  See Afua Hirsch, Fears 
Over Non-Muslim’s Use of Islamic Law to Resolve Disputes, GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/mar/14/non-muslims-sharia-law-uk; 
Online Video: Lord Philip Hunt, Minister for Justice, Remarks at the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal Panel on Liberation from Forced Marriages, Birmingham, 
England (July 20, 2008), http://www.matribunal.com/initiative_s_lh.html 
(endorsing the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal for addressing the issue of forced 
marriages in the United Kingdom, including its ―Liberation from Forced 
Marriages‖ initiative); Values and Equalities of MAT, MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, 
http://www.matribunal.com/values.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) 
(highlighting the values of MAT and encouraging the co-existence of civil and 
personal religious laws). 
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basis, and the policy arguments articulated against it that led to the 
eventual legislative ban on arbitration of family law issues under 
any law except Ontario law.  Through this process, I will 
demonstrate that religious arbitration in Ontario did not present 
any constitutional or other legal issues prior to the ban in 2006, and 
that the ban was motivated by baseless fears of Islamic law 
(Shari‘a) and the lobbying of various organizations, despite 
positive recommendations from government-ordered investigative 
research.  I will then explore the history of religious arbitration in 
the United Kingdom, the development of the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal, and its initiative on forced marriages in the United 
Kingdom.  Using the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal as a baseline, I 
will demonstrate how religious arbitration in Ontario could 
provide substantial benefits to the Muslim community and Ontario 
as a whole.  To do this, I will first analyze the concerns of IICJ 
opponents, in light of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal example, 
and then proceed to suggest various positive public policy 
implications in Ontario if the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal model 
were to be applied. 
2. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN ONTARIO 
Before one can critique Ontario‘s ban on religious arbitration 
effectuated under the Family Statute Law Amendment Act and 
advocate for religious arbitration, one must first become 
familiarized with the historical background of religious arbitration 
in Ontario.  This requires a brief review of the origins of the Islamic 
Institute of Civil Justice, its purpose and legal validity prior to the 
religious arbitration ban.  Understanding the political climate and 
abrupt actions of the provincial government in 2006 will clarify the 
original just basis for the IICJ and the unfounded grounds on 
which the proposal was quashed. 
 
2.1.  Historical background of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice and 
religious arbitration in Ontario 
The controversy over using religious law to resolve family law 
issues in Ontario arose when the Canadian Society of Muslims, led 
by Syed Mumtaz Ali, proposed the establishment of Darul Qada, or 
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Muslim arbitration board.5  This proposed arbitration board, 
otherwise known as the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, would 
provide mediation and arbitration services for a range of issues, 
including family law.6  The IICJ was proposed to provide Muslims 
living in Ontario with the option to resolve personal law matters 
according to religious values and beliefs, while remaining within 
the framework of the Ontario judiciary system and integrated with 
the social fabric in Ontario.7  Because Islam is viewed as a holistic 
way of life, with all aspects of social life being guided by religious 
values,8 the IICJ provided a practical institution through which 
Muslims could stay true to their beliefs, regulate personal law in a 
manner with which they might be most comfortable, and exist 
within the broader legal system in Ontario.9 
Syed Mumtaz Ali‘s proposal was presented amidst the social 
context of Muslims being one of the fastest growing minority 
groups in Ontario.10  Recognizing that socio-political tensions 
hindered their integration into society in a post September 11, 2001 
 
5 See James Thornback, The Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario, 10 APPEAL REV. 
CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 1, 5 (2005) (noting that Syed Mumtaz Ali‘s proposal for a 
Muslim arbitration board sparked public debate in the media and opposition from 
various interest groups). 
6 Id. 
7 Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Canadian 
Society of Muslims, in Toronto, Ontario (Aug., 1995), 
http://muslimcanada.org/pfl.pdf (explaining that the goal of establishing 
arbitration of personal/family law according to Islamic Law is to enable Muslims 
to live according to their beliefs while working within the Canadian judicial 
system and broader social fabric). 
8 See generally FREDERICK M. DENNY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 107–37, 195 
(2d ed. 1994) (describing the basic tenets and beliefs of Islam as ―a religion and a 
way of life, extending into all areas of the community‘s existence and activity‖); 
JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 1 (1986) ( ―From the days of 
the Prophet [pbuh], Islam was not just a religion but a complete code for living, 
combining the spiritual and the temporal, and seeking to regulate not only the 
individual‘s relationship with God, but all human social relationships.‖). 
9 See Mills, supra note 7 (highlighting how the use of personal/family law is 
an ―opportunity to live your Islam to the best extent possible in the Canadian 
democratic context‖). 
10 See Donald Brown, Comment, A Destruction of Muslim Identity: Ontario’s 
Decision to Stop Shari‘a-based Arbitration, 32 N.C.J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 495, 510 
(2007) (providing a history of the presence of Muslims in Canada and the 
population‘s subsequent development into the country‘s largest religious 
minority). 
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context,11 Ali hypothesized that if Muslims could practice their 
religion by leveraging the legal system they would be able to 
constructively address pertinent communal issues and contribute 
to the broader social fabric.12  As will be shown, it would 
encourage them to substantively enhance their participation in 
Ontario‘s democratic legal system.  Despite the proposals potential 
for enhanced social integration, positive public policy effects, and 
legal validity (until 2006), the idea of Shari‘a being applied through 
the Ontario legal system sparked strong opposition.13  
Misconceptions voiced by various organizations about human 
rights and women‘s rights issues under Shari‘a14 fueled strong 
 
11 Id. at 495–96. 
12  See id. at 544 (explaining that religious arbitration in Ontario would allow 
Muslims to maintain their identity, yet be subject to procedural safeguards on 
conscionability). 
13 See MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, 
PROMOTING INCLUSION 5 (2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus 
.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf (explaining that fears about 
religious arbitration in Ontario, specifically regarding women‘s rights, were 
exacerbated); Thornback, supra note 5, at 7–8 (examining an article representative 
of the criticisms levied against the enactment of Shari‘a law); Walker, supra note 1, 
at 98 (suggesting that despite the recommendations by former Ontario Attorney 
General Marion Boyd to permit arbitration, even in the religious law context, 
Premier McGuinty‘s decision relied upon feminist critiques of multiculturalism). 
14 See generally EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE 
EXPERTS DETERMINE HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD 25–32 (1981) 
(characterizing the Western view of Islam as being backward and despotic 
through an Orientalist lens that bolsters a view of the West as rational, liberal, 
right-thinking, honest, and progressive, which has been perpetuated in Western 
media following the Iranian revolution and an assumption by the United States of 
the imperial role historically played by France and Britain); Khalida Tanvir Syed, 
Misconceptions About Human Rights and Women’s Rights in Islam, 39 INTERCHANGE 
245 (2008) (addressing common misconceptions about human rights and women‘s 
rights in Islam and the parallels between Shari‘a and the United Nations‘ 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  Negative sentiment regarding Shari‘a in 
general has become so commonplace that Justice Frankfurter even insulted it as a 
legal system in his dissenting opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) by 
saying, ―[t]his is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules.  We do not 
sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of 
individual expediency‖ and suggesting that Shari‘a is an irrational and arbitrary 
approach to legal decision-making diametrically opposed to the formal, rational 
approach of the U.S. legal system.  Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 11.  This remark was 
made despite Islamic Law‘s striking similarity in terms of structure, subject 
matter, substance, and approach to Jewish law, which has historically been cited 
as persuasive authority in Western courts.  See Lee Ann Bambach, The 
Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining 
the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. L. & RELIGION 379, 379–80 (2010) (discussing the 
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opposition to the IICJ.15  Amidst this negative public spotlight on 
the IICJ, Premier McGuinty sought advice from the Attorney 
General, Michael Bryant, and the Minister Responsible for 
Women‘s Issues, Sandra Pupatello.16  These Ministers 
commissioned Marion Boyd, seasoned politician and former 
Attorney General, to explore the use of religious arbitration and its 
potential impact on vulnerable people.17  Boyd‘s research (the Boyd 
Report) determined that religious arbitration was legal and safe for 
use in Ontario, provided that the tribunals made use of practical 
safeguards in their administration.18  Although the Ontario 
government initially endorsed the proposal, pressure from various 
interest groups and organizations convinced Ontario Premier 
Dalton McGuinty to pass legislation blocking the proposed 
arbitration tribunal, despite the results of the Boyd Report.19  In 
February 2006, Ontario‘s legislature passed the Family Statute Law 
Amendment Act, prohibiting family law arbitration from using 
anything other than Ontario law as the basis for arbitration.20 
 
Supreme Court‘s approving use of ―Mosaic Law,‖ based on the Torah, to bolster 
Western moral thought). 
15 See Aslam, supra note 3, at 850 (understanding the argument of critics to be 
that women lack the protection of a court‘s safeguards in a way that disparately 
impacts them and therefore violates section 15 of the Canadian Charter). 
16 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 4–5 (describing the strong concerns of Muslim 
women‘s groups as a force behind seeking advice from Bryant and Pupatello). 
17 See id. at 5 (noting that the report is the result of a 2004 mandate to Boyd 
from the Attorney General and the Minister Responsible for Women‘s Issues to 
explore the use of private arbitration in family and inheritance cases as well as the 
impact such practices may have on vulnerable people).  
18 See id. at 133–42 (recommending that the Arbitration Act should be 
continued to permit arbitration under religious law, provided that certain 
safeguards are maintained).  Safeguards identified by Boyd included, among 
others, affording mediation and arbitration agreements the same protection under 
the Arbitration Act as ―domestic contracts,‖ procedural mechanisms for the 
setting aside of arbitration, and mediation agreements similar to domestic 
contracts.  Id. 
19 See Walker, supra note 1, at 100–03 (discussing the Boyd report and 
explaining that the proposed arbitration panel would result in benefits while 
alleviating problems such as inadequate oversight of family arbitration). 
20 Id. at 104 (explaining that ―the Ontario legislature passed the Family 
Statute Law Amendment Act to give effect to McGuinty‘s promise that there 
would be one law for all Ontarians‖). 
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2.2. Pre-2006 Legal Basis for Religious Arbitration in Ontario 
The IICJ would have operated within the requirements of the 
Family Law Act and Arbitration Act of 1991.21  After a careful 
analysis of the Family Law Act and Arbitration Act of 1991, it is 
clear that the IICJ was a legally valid method of resolving family 
law disputes outside of court.  Further, the two pieces of legislation 
provided both procedural and substantive protections that enabled 
institutions like the IICJ to operate without compromising the 
rights and freedoms of parties who submitted to arbitration.22 
Under the Family Law Act, couples may enter into domestic 
contracts, including marriage and separation agreements that 
define each spouse‘s respective rights relating to property, support, 
children, and ―any other matter in the settlement of their affairs.‖23  
These contracts allow couples to enter into arbitration and 
mediation agreements.24  Prior to 2006, under sections 2, 31, and 32 
of the Arbitration Act, couples could submit to arbitration, and 
mutually agree upon an arbitrator and the law that such arbitrator 
would apply to resolve their disputes.25  The IICJ would provide a 
formal institution that would arbitrate these disputes according to 
Shari‘a law, and Ontario courts would enforce the resulting 
arbitration agreements.26  Under section 37, arbitration awards 
would be binding unless changed on appeal or set aside by the 
 
21 See Thornback, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that ―the Family Law Act and 
the Arbitration Act combine to allow spouses to contract out of the usual family 
law provisions with a minimal amount of judicial oversight‖). 
22 See Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 ss. 52–54; Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 
1991, c. 17, §§ 2, 31, 32, 37; 45; 46(1) (outlining the various procedural mechanisms 
that protect parties in submitting to and conducting arbitration in Ontario); 
Hercus v. Hercus (2001), 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 340, paras. 96–99, [2001] O.J. No. 534 
(as a matter of public policy, ―equally and fairly‖ can speak to substantive law 
matters, and is not limited to procedural fairness, in matters pertaining to family 
law disputes); Thornback, supra note 5, at 5–7 (detailing the IICJ‘s role as an 
arbitrator and mediator in family law). 
23 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, §§ 52–54. 
24 See id. § 52 (―Two persons who are married to each other or intend to 
marry may enter into an agreement in which they agree on their respective rights 
and obligations . . . .‖). 
25 See Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, §§ 2, 31, 32 (stating the 
applicability of various laws under different types of arbitration). 
26 See Thornback, supra note 5, at 5–6 (noting that couples can agree to submit 
to arbitration in a domestic contract). 
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court.27  Questions of law may be appealed with permission of the 
court.28 
In general, courts provide a high level of deference to 
arbitration awards.29  However, there is indication that courts 
employ a lower level of deference on family law issues.30  This 
lower level of deference is exercised through a limited number of 
grounds on which an arbitration award may be set aside.  For 
example, courts exercise parens patriae jurisdiction in disputes 
involving children to alter arbitration awards.31  For other issues in 
family disputes, a decision may be set aside if a party was not 
―treated equally and fairly,‖ which encompasses more than just 
procedural fairness.32  This can encompass situations where the 
arbitrator was unfairly biased against one party or an arbitration 
decision was obtained by fraud.33 
Together, the Family Law Act and Arbitration Act of 1991 
created a sensible legal framework through which the IICJ could 
have operated.  The two acts provided grounds through which 
parties could appeal to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
and settle disputes contractually.  The two acts enabled procedural 
and substantive mechanisms to protect all parties‘ rights, and gave 
the judiciary an oversight and appellate role of review to ensure 
those rights were maintained. 
 
27 See Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 37 (providing that ―an award 
binds the parties, unless it is set aside or varied‖). 
28 See id. § 45 (―[A] party may appeal an award to the court on a question of 
law with leave . . . .‖). 
29 Duguay v. Thompson-Duguay (2000), 7 R.F.L. (5th) 301 at para. 31, [2000] 
O.T.C. 299, [2000] O.J. No. 1541 [Duguay cited to R.F.L.] (explaining that courts are 
reluctant to interfere with arbitration decisions and substitute their own judgment 
in matters resolved by private parties). 
30 See id. para. 41 (noting that under the Children‘s Law Reform Act, the court 
retains ―its parens patriae jurisdiction to intervene when necessary in the best 
interests of children‖). 
31 Id. (same). 
32 See Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 46(1) (stating the reasons an 
arbitration agreement may be set aside, such as fraud or legal incapacity of one 
the parties); see also Hercus v. Hercus (2001), 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 340, paras. 96–99, 
[2001] O.J. No. 534 (finding that as a matter of public policy, ―equally and fairly‖ 
can speak to substantive law matters and is not limited to procedural fairness, in 
matters pertaining to family law disputes). 
33 See Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 46(1) (stating the grounds on 
which a court may set aside an award). 
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2.3. Constitutional Concerns Regarding Religious Arbitration Are 
Unfounded as Charter Scrutiny Does Not Apply to Private 
Actions 
Some interest groups have argued that arbitration of family law 
issues under religious law creates constitutional problems.34  In 
particular, critics such as the National Association of Women and 
the Law (NAWL) have argued that under Section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, religious arbitration of 
family law disputes is unconstitutional.35  Section 15(1) provides 
that where the Charter is applicable, ―[e]very individual is equal 
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.‖36  
Critics use this standard in conjunction with Section 28 of the 
Charter to argue that religious arbitration of family law and 
inheritance matters violates the Charter because it does not 
explicitly protect the equality of rights of women and children.37 
Despite this argument, it is clear that religious arbitration of 
family and inheritance issues create no constitutional issues.  First, 
under Section 32(1) of the Charter, the Charter applies 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect 
of all matters within the authority of Parliament including 
all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest 
Territories; and 
 
34 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 71–73 (summarizing various arguments by 
commentators as to why religious arbitration of family law issues raises 
constitutional issues). 
35 Id. at 31. 
36 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1), Part I of The 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c.11 (U.K.). 
37 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 71–72 (expressing the opinion that ―agreeing to 
be bound by an arbitrator‘s decision . . . not subject to Charter scrutiny,‖ but 
noting that critics leverage Section 15(1) and Section 28 to raise an argument that 
religious arbitration of family law disputes is unconstitutional). 
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(b) to the legislature and government of each province in 
respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature 
of each province.38 
Section 32(1) creates a distinction between public actions and 
private actions.  In essence, Section 32(1) restricts the Charter‘s 
application to state action under statute, common law, and through 
third parties who are given power to act by governmental 
agencies.39  The Supreme Court of Canada‘s standard to determine 
whether there is a sufficient degree of government control in public 
action through third parties requires ―both an institutional and a 
structural link between a public body and the government . . . .‖40  
Such a link exists ―where the government delegates power to a 
non-government actor or agency.‖41  The state confers power that it 
is granted by statute or common law.42  However, if the decisions 
that guide day-to-day operations of an institution are not 
controlled or made by the government, the Charter does not apply, 
despite authority being granted by statute.43  As former Attorney 
General Marion Boyd explains in the Boyd Report, private actions 
are not subject to Charter scrutiny: 
Conversely, institutions . . . which derive their existence 
and powers from statute, are nonetheless deemed not to be 
controlled by government, if decisions that guide the day-
to-day operations of these organizations are not taken by 
government.  Therefore, in spite of being public 
institutions, in the case of hospitals and universities, or 
simply being regulated by statute, in the case of 
corporations, these entities are not bound by the Charter.  
On the other hand, as mentioned above, if the body is 
 
38 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 32. Part I of The Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.). 
39 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 69–71 (explaining that Section 32 both expands 
and limits the scope of the Charter‘s application).   
40 Id. at 70.   
41 Id.   
42 See id. at 69 (―[A]nything that constitutes government action, including 
legislation and regulation, is subject to the Charter.  This includes action taken 
under the common law.‖).   
43 See id. at 70 (―Where a public service is being performed independently of 
government control the required link is not present and the Charter will not 
apply.‖). 
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implementing a specific government policy, then Charter 
scrutiny will ensue.44   
Such institutions include schools, hospitals, universities and 
corporations.45   
Arbitration decisions fall within the realm of private actions.46  
They are private because the decisions reflect the private, personal 
relationships of the parties involved, and the arbitrator derives his 
or her authority directly from the consent of the parties agreeing to 
arbitrate, and not from the Arbitration Act.47  There is no state 
compulsion to arbitrate.48 
Given that religious arbitration would be subject to the 
requirement of voluntariness, and would not constitute a public 
action, religious arbitration decisions would not be subject to 
Charter scrutiny.49  This does not mean that arbitrations would not 
be subject to judicial review in limited contexts, as earlier 
explained, but no constitutional issues are created by permitting 
religious arbitration of family law issues. 
One should note that this justification hinges on a requirement 
of voluntariness.  The voluntariness requirement begs the question 
of whether, in practice, individuals would voluntarily assent to 
religious arbitration, or be forced into arbitration through various 
communal or other pressures.  Although this is a valid concern, it 
will be shown that the concern easily dissolves in the context of a 
 
44 Id. (citing Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.); 
Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (Can.); McKinney v. Univ. of Guelph, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (Can.); Stoffman v. Vancouver Gen. Hosp., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 
(Can.)). 
45 See, e.g., id. (explaining that these institutions are not bound to the Charter, 
despite being public institutions, due to their independence from public influence 
on operations and daily decision making). 
46 Id. at 72 (indicating that arbitrations are private rather than public actions, 
because they address private relationships between parties and because 
arbitrators derive authority from each party‘s consent, rather than from public 
institutions). 
47 See id. (observing that the Arbitration Act neither compels people to 
arbitrate nor confers authority upon arbiters). 
48 See id. (―Muslims in Ontario retain . . . the right to choose the traditional 
justice system . . . for the resolution of their disputes.  If they choose not to avail 
themselves of the services of an arbitrator who applies Islamic legal principles, the 
law does not compel them to do so.‖). 
49 See id. (clarifying that religious and family law arbitrations decided 
pursuant to the Arbitration Act would not be subject to the Charter).   
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religious arbitration tribunal administrated with the proper 
procedural guidelines and substantive considerations to protect 
and foster voluntary and informed consent.  As issues of 
voluntariness will be addressed shortly, one can easily conclude 
that religious arbitration and the IICJ were completely justified and 
permitted in Ontario prior to 2006, raising strong suggestions that 
the ban on religious arbitration in Ontario was motivated by non-
legal considerations. 
3. THE FEAR OF SHARI‘A AND SUPPOSED PUBLIC POLICY 
OBJECTIONS TO ARBITRATION UNDER RELIGIOUS LAW IN ONTARIO 
3.1. Specific Objections to the IICJ and Religious Arbitration of Family 
Law Disputes 
Various interest groups that were outspoken against the IICJ 
proposal voiced numerous concerns against arbitration of family or 
personal law matters under Shari‘a.50  These concerns included 
inequity of power between genders in the context of religious 
arbitration, lack of informed consent to arbitration, sociocultural 
pressures limiting voluntary consent, and others.51  Each of these 
concerns is addressed by the functional model of the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal in the United Kingdom and can easily be 
addressed in Ontario given the MAT‘s example.  But before 
presenting the MAT‘s solutions to each of these concerns and how 
they may be implemented in Ontario, it is worth exploring each 
concern on its own merit to better understand the baseless grounds 
for objecting to religious arbitration in Ontario, as well as to 
appreciate the sophistication of the MAT in the United Kingdom. 
3.1.1.  Issue #1:  Inherent Inequity Between Men and Women in 
Religious Arbitration 
The most common objection to the use of religious arbitration 
was the supposed inherent inequity between men and women in 
most religious contexts, and the resulting imbalance of power in 
 
50 See infra Sections 3.1.1–3.1.4 (analyzing the common arguments of gender 
inequality, lack of voluntary submission, lack of informed consent, and specific 
issues pertaining to foreign spouses). 
51 See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 13, at 48–49 (quoting a variety of submissions 
from societies attempting to explain the practical implications of ‖religiously 
based arbitration‖). 
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the arbitration setting.52  Further, the risk of jeopardizing the 
wellbeing of children involved in disputes was a common 
concern.53  The Canadian Council of Muslim Women, an 
outspoken group against the IICJ, summarized these concerns by 
depicting a biased and patriarchal model of Muslim family law: 
It is generally accepted that men are the head of the state, 
the mosque and the family.  The responsibilities outlined 
for males is that they will provide for their families and 
because they spend of their wealth, they have the 
leadership to direct and guide the members of their 
families, including the women . . . .  Most proponents of 
Muslim law accept that men have the right to marry up to 
four wives;54 that they can divorce unilaterally;55 that . . . [i]f 
the wife wants a divorce she goes to court, while the 
husband has the right to repudiate the union without 
recourse to courts.56   
 
52 See id. (explaining that amidst numerous solicitations for opinions on 
religious arbitration in Ontario, the most frequent objection was that of gender 
inequity in religious contexts, with notable opinions given by the Women‘s Legal 
Education and Action Fund and the Canadian Council of Muslim Women). 
53 See id. at 48 (―[W]hat is at stake is control and support of women and 
children.‖) (quoting the Submission of Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) 
(Sept. 17, 2004)).   
54 But it must be kept in mind that Shari‘a, as used to refer specifically to 
Islamic law, is not a single legal code, but rather a pluralistic legal system with 
multiple schools of thought and sophisticated legal techniques to engage in legal 
reasoning and interpretation ranging from linguistics, hermeneutics, grammar, 
and sophisticated statutory interpretive techniques (usul al-fiqh).  Legal rulings are 
derived from the Quran and Sunnah (sayings and life example of the Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh)), through strategies including judicial opinion (ijtihad), 
analogy (qiyas), adoption by others (istihsan) and consensus (ijma’).  See generally 
FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM 100–01 (1966) (providing an overview of the meaning of 
Shari‘a).  For example, although it is traditionally held that chapter 4, verse 3 of 
the Quran allows a Muslim man to marry up to four women only if he can treat 
them justly, some challenge this position because chapter 4, verse 129 states that a 
man will never be able to deal fairly and justly between women.  As a result, 
polygamy has been banned in Tunisia.  See NASIR, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that 
not all Muslim jurists hold that polygamy is permitted in Shari‘a).   
55 See generally DAWOUD S. EL ALAMI & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE ARAB WORLD 22–32 (1996) (explaining the 
various methods of divorce under Islamic law). 
56 BOYD, supra note 13, at 48 (quoting the Submission of the Canadian Council 
of Muslim Women of July 23, 2004). 
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These issues collectively were meant to suggest that not only is 
Shari‘a law unfair to women and children and perpetuates a 
patriarchal system of family law, but that it also impedes the safety 
of women and children where domestic abuse may be a factor in 
family disputes.57 
3.1.2.  Issue #2:  Lack of Voluntary Submission to Religious 
Arbitration 
Apart from issues regarding gender inequity, some have 
questioned whether the parties involved in religious arbitration of 
family law issues actually voluntarily consent to it.58  Many interest 
groups, such as the Women‘s Legal Education and Action Fund 
(LEAF), argue that women may be forced into arbitration due to a 
diverse set of pressures.59  These pressures include conformity to 
culture and avoidance of resolving personal matters in public 
forums, pressure to submit to what is believed to be a religious 
dispute resolution mechanism so that one may consider 
themselves, and be considered by their community, a righteous 
and practicing Muslim, pressure from family and community 
members, and fear of social exclusion.60 
 
57 See Caryn Litt Wolfe, Note, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An 
Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 460 (2006) (exploring various concerns regarding gender 
inequality, such as women being disadvantaged by ―religious laws and the 
cultural views of male-female relationships,‖ in faith-based arbitration). 
58 See id. at 463–64 (questioning whether religious arbitration will protect 
women amidst social and familial pressure, given that courts have been reluctant 
to identify these pressures as forms of duress); see also BOYD, supra note 13, at 50–
51 (stating that women may feel compelled to submit to arbitration due to 
economic, social and cultural pressures). 
59 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (detailing the view of specific advocacy 
groups that suggests that cultural, religious, and ―fear of social exclusion‖ 
pressures will be prevalent).  
60 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50–51 (listing the cultural, and religious 
pressures that women would experience); Maria Reiss, Note, The Materialization of 
Legal Pluralism in Britain: Why Shari’a Council Decisions Should Be Non-Binding, 26 
ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 739, 764 (2009) (considering that ―[the] outcomes are 
especially worrisome when considering the pressure Muslim women receive from 
their family and community‖); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 461, 463–64 (highlighting 
that sociocultural factors can restrict a woman‘s ability to make voluntary choices 
to submit to arbitration for fear of reprimand or social exclusion). 
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In many Muslim immigrant communities in Canada, there is a 
desire to be integrated into the broader community.61  Amidst this 
desire, immigrants are often subject to communal and familial 
pressure to resolve family disputes either through extended family 
intervention or the assistance of respected community members.62  
These methods of dispute resolution are often insensitive to an 
individual‘s rights and can impose patriarchal biases, but are 
tolerated for the sake of community acceptance or inter-familial 
relationships.63  Thus, according to this theory, many Muslims, 
especially women, may be considered bad adherents to their faith, 
socially shunned and excluded from society, or alienated from 
family.64  A person may even be subjected to economic hardship if 
 
61 See Brown, supra note 10, at 510–513 (explaining that the Muslim 
population in Canada, which consists largely of immigrants and second 
generation Canadians, is confronted with the challenge of attaining religious 
freedom from a social framework that incorporates activities that are beyond the 
limits of Islam).  Some Muslims feel pressured to integrate with broader society at 
the expense of various religious beliefs or practices.  Thus, while many Muslims 
do continue to perform many of the five ―pillars of faith‖ to varying degrees, 
many struggle to find a balance.  Further, although the Muslim population in 
Canada does cultivate a strong sense of Canadian identity, some Muslims 
continue to experience racism or discrimination based on their religious identity 
and believe their identity is under attack by social pressures.  Id. 
62 See Shari’a in the West—Whose Law Counts Most?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, 
at 61, 62 (explaining that many Muslims still submit to non-binding arbitration 
often administered informally, which defeats the purpose of the ban on 
arbitration of family law issues in Ontario). 
63 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (highlighting that women may fear that if 
they do not submit to religious arbitration, they may be considered a bad 
adherent to their faith or endure both social and economic reprimand in the 
context of insulated culturally defined communities); MUSLIM ARBITRATION 
TRIBUNAL, REPORT—LIBERATION FROM FORCED MARRIAGES 5–9, available at 
http://www.matribunal.com/downloads/MAT%20Forced%20Marriage%20Rep
ort.pdf (noting various methods through which individuals may be forced into 
marriages due to cultural influence, and various rituals and traditions that are 
common in cultural belief); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 461, 463–65 (finding that 
women suffer greatly as a result of multiculturalism). 
64 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (noting that the Legal Education and Action 
fund suggests that arbitration is not chosen freely in numerous instances); MUSLIM 
ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 5–9 (detailing the background of forced 
marriages and the cultural, religious, and familial pressures associated with the 
practice); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 461, 463–64 (describing the pressures women 
feel to pass on cultural and religious ideologies whereas even an accusation of 
disloyalty may be enough to force them into religious arbitration). 
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his or her economic life depends on close association with his or 
her faith-based community.65 
3.1.3.  Issue #3: Lack of Informed Consent to Religious Arbitration 
Critics also have argued that the parties to arbitration, 
especially women, may not be fully informed about their rights 
under Ontario law and the legal implications of arbitration.66  
People may simply be unaware of their rights under Ontario 
family law and are coerced into arbitration.67  Further, when 
submitting to arbitration, the parties may not be aware of the 
binding effect of arbitration agreements, how to procedurally 
contest an arbitration agreement, or the benefits and costs of 
alternative methods of dispute resolution.68  In conjunction with a 
patriarchal community and dangerous social implications, this lack 
of knowledge can severely impact the well-being of women and 
children.69  It can subject women to abusive domestic relations 
resulting from unfair arbitration decisions, and put children at risk 
of physical abuse as well as psychological trauma resulting from 
domestic violence. 
 
65 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (quoting a September 17, 2004 submission of 
the Legal Education and Action Fund which states that, ―there are many women 
whose economic lives depend on close association with their faith-based 
community or cultural group‖); MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 8 
(noting that parents may threaten revocation of inheritance or financial support if 
their child does not consent to an arranged marriage). 
66 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 52 (citing to respondents opposed to the use of 
religious based arbitration who suggest that insufficient understanding of the law 
prevents women from fully comprehending the consequences of choosing 
between religious law and the courts); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 464 (noting that 
many women who are pressured into religious arbitration are not familiar with 
the legal system in Ontario and their accompanying civil liberties and civil rights). 
67  See BOYD, supra note 13, at 52 (arguing that many respondents who were 
opposed to the use of religious based arbitration did not understand the 
interaction between Canadian and religious practices). 
68 See id. (arguing that the majority of respondents opposed to the use of 
religiously based arbitration maintained that ―women in relatively closed Muslim 
communities‖ cannot fully know the consequences of proceeding under Canadian 
Law versus religious arbitration); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 464 (observing that 
many who consent to religious arbitration are unaware of their entitlement to a 
lawyer). 
69 See Wolfe, supra note 57, at 464 (stating that informational lapses cause 
unknowing deprivation of rights). 
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3.1.4.  Issue #4: Religious Arbitration Involving a Foreign Spouse 
Finally, many commentators object to the use of religious 
arbitration for disputes involving marriage contracts that were 
entered into in other countries.70  It is not unusual for recent 
Muslim immigrants, or second generation Canadians under 
pressure from their parents and community and against their own 
will, to wed a Muslim from their country of origin.71  This practice 
is common for several reasons:  it helps maintain family or social 
ties, it is a cultural practice, and it is a simple mechanism to enable 
immigrants to attain citizenship in Canada.72 
There are several risks commonly associated with such 
marriage contracts being subject to religious arbitration.  First, the 
inclusion of arbitration clauses in these marriage contracts may not 
be properly understood by the foreign spouse due to language 
barriers or lack of familiarity with Ontario law and may cause the 
foreign spouse to compromise his or her rights in Ontario at the 
outset of the marriage.73  Second, religious arbitration clauses in 
these contracts can force a foreign spouse into family dispute 
resolution methods where arbitrators have a gender bias.74  Faced 
with social and familial pressures, foreign spouses may find 
themselves in marriages and domestic circumstances that they 
 
70 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (explaining that it is not uncommon for a 
Canadian spouse to return to their country of origin for marriage). 
71 See id. at 49 (noting that the Review heard of many instances ―where 
women were contracted to marry without their knowledge and then could not 
invalidate the contract‖); MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 10 
(noting that a similar trend exists in England regarding marrying foreign spouses, 
often times under communal or family coercion). 
72 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 49–50 (discussing arranged marriages and their 
role in Muslim tradition); MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 5–11 
(highlighting some of the rationales behind forced marriages, such as tradition 
and securing citizenship for one party). 
73 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (noting that a woman may be bound by her 
consent to religious arbitration in her marriage contract even though she did not 
participate in its creation); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 464 (asserting that communities 
are ―so insular and self-sufficient that members may not be aware of all of their 
rights‖). 
74 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50–51 (discussing a September 22, 2004 
submission of Karen Graham that argues that some religious and community 
leaders are male traditionalists who hold tightly to outdated and inaccurate 
beliefs that conflate cultural custom with religious law); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 
460–61 (stating that ―religious cultures often perpetuate the idea that women are 
subordinate and inferior creatures‖). 
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never wished to be a part of, nor could have foreseen.75  Given that 
these marriage contracts involve recent immigrants who often lack 
a social support system of family and friends to cope with abusive 
domestic issues in a new country, religious arbitration can limit 
immigrants in their recourse to get out of the marriage without 
being stigmatized for opting for a non-religious dispute resolution 
mechanism.76  Finally, it can force Canadian citizens into remaining 
in marriages that they did not want to enter, and limit their rights 
amidst abusive spouses or grim family circumstances.77 
3.2. General Objections to Arbitration of Family Law Disputes 
Apart from specific objections to religious arbitration under 
Shari‘a, various interest groups raise several arguments against 
arbitration of family law disputes, generally.  First, critics raise 
constitutional issues against arbitration of family law disputes 
under the Charter and Arbitration Act.78  This argument was 
sufficiently dismissed, as earlier explained.  Apart from the legality 
issue, some also voiced a concern for the balance of power in 
alternative dispute resolution of family law matters, especially 
where domestic violence may subject women to dangerous 
circumstances.79  The National Association of Women and the Law 
(NAWL) raises the concern that arbitration agreements entered 
into at the time of marriage may limit a spouse‘s options where an 
issue arises years later and the spouse would prefer to resolve an 
unforeseen issue through the court system.80  Gender-biased 
 
75  See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50–51 (describing the pressures culture can 
place on compliance with forced marriages). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (noting that individuals may be stuck in marriages to keep up 
appearances where the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes, lack 
of support or guidance when encountering abuse, or pressure from familial or 
communal relations). 
78 See id. at 71–72 (discussing the limited scope and applicability of the 
Charter).  See generally Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Shari’a Law:  
Examining Ontario’s Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. 
HUM. RTS. 1 (2004) (outlining what an argument might look like to challenge 
religious arbitration on constitutional grounds as a violation of the Charter). 
79 See Bakht, supra note 78, at 2–3 (noting that personal relationships and 
circumstances can change drastically from the time of entering into marriage, 
which may make compulsory arbitration undesirable as a matter of public policy 
to protect women in abusive or otherwise unwanted marriages). 
80 See id. at 3. 
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alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and sociocultural 
pressures compound these dangers.  
NAWL also takes concern with the public/private dichotomy 
which enables the government to effectively ―clean its hands‖ of 
any responsibility for the state of the ‗private‘ world in the name of 
judicial efficiency, at the cost of personal rights of individuals in 
family disputes.81  Alfred Mamo, a lawyer from London, Ontario 
who frequently acts as an arbitrator, summarizes the concern: 
One big deficiency with the arbitration process is that it 
does not need to adhere to the traditional concept of open 
justice, which ensures a just result through transparency, 
public scrutiny and accountability.  This lack of openness 
can easily lead to the vulnerable being drawn into a process 
that is not procedurally or substantively in keeping with 
the principles of fundamental justice.  Given the private 
nature of the process, especially in cases where there is no 
appeal from the arbitrator‘s decision, the process and the 
substantive result are both immune from scrutiny.82 
Further, A. Burke Doran, a common arbitrator in Ontario, explains 
that many of the procedural and substantive advantages of private 
solutions like arbitration may be lost where the busy schedule of 
the arbitrator and delays in the presentation of evidence prolongs 
the length of the arbitration process.83  In these cases, he opines, 
arbitrators could be inclined to be overly patient or reluctant to 
issue harsh resolutions.84  Thus, the public/private dichotomy may 
cleanse the hands of the courts at the expense of the public. 
 
81 See Susan Boyd, Introduction to CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: 
FEMINISM, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (Susan Boyd ed., 1997) (explaining that 
through a process of re-privatization of public institutions that are used to ensure 
the rights and economic status of the underprivileged in society, the 
disadvantaged become further disadvantaged by depoliticizing the disparities 
that arise through privatization). 
82 BOYD, supra note 13, at 34 (quoting the September 16, 2004 submission of 
Alfred Mamo). 
83 Id. (contrasting the premise that arbitration is time and cost efficient with 
issues that can arise to eliminate these efficiencies in practice). 
84 Id. (noting that in private arbitration settings, neutral parties acting as 
arbitrators or mediators may allow emotions, general reluctance of harsh 
penalties, or other factors that would not arise in public court to make an impact 
on arbitration decisions).  This can be problematic in ensuring just outcomes, 
especially where arbitration decisions are binding and non-appealable. 
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4. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Religious arbitration in the United Kingdom addresses all of 
the issues that opponents to the IICJ in Ontario raise, and even 
presents unique benefits such as remedying sociocultural pressures 
involving domestic violence and forced marriages, and enabling 
Muslims to participate and contribute in the broader legal system.  
Additional benefits include the social integration of Muslims in 
Western societies, protection of people‘s human rights, and the 
establishment of judicial regulation and review of otherwise 
entirely private and unregulated community derived solutions.  
However, to fully appreciate how current religious arbitration in 
the United Kingdom accomplishes this and presents a model 
example for Ontario, one must become familiar with the history of 
Islamic arbitration in the United Kingdom and the development of 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.  Reflecting upon the origins of a 
demand for religious arbitration in the United Kingdom and the 
subsequent initiatives that the MAT developed,85 it will become 
clear that the issues raised by critics in Ontario are easily dealt 
with. 
4.1. Evolution and Legality of Islamic Arbitration in the United 
Kingdom 
4.1.1.  Origin of Islamic Arbitration in the United Kingdom and the 
Growing Demand for Binding Religious Arbitration 
Shari‘a arbitration has evolved and developed into an effective 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism in secular countries, 
amidst growing demand for Shari‘a based solutions to disputes.  A 
recent survey by the Centre for Social Cohesion found that forty 
percent of Muslim students in the United Kingdom wanted Shari‘a 
 
85 See infra Section 4.2 (giving an overview of the sophisticated procedural 
guidelines of the MAT that address issues such as gender biases, informed 
consent, voluntariness, and language barriers); infra Section 4.3. (providing an 
account of proactive initiatives on human rights abuses in the context of forced 
marriages); infra Section 5 (analyzing how the MAT‘s model encourages social 
integration by empowering the Muslim community through community derived 
justice within the broader legal system, and uniquely addresses the sociocultural 
issues of the Muslim community by leveraging well informed legal professionals 
and religious scholars placed within a sophisticated, regulated dispute resolution 
mechanism). 
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law introduced there.86  In the United Kingdom, Muslims have 
submitted to informal ―Shari‘a Councils‖ to resolve their matters 
for roughly thirty years.87  These tribunals originally operated out 
of mosques, and were not considered legally binding.88  They 
normally sat in private, with a single Islamic scholar presiding.89  
They provided an outlet for people to resolve issues within their 
community according to their own values.90  The disputants 
typically had control to select the authority to which they 
appealed, but recourse was still available in the legal system 
because the decision of the arbitrator was non-binding.91  These 
non-binding decisions were merely accepted if the parties agreed 
and were intended to be an amicable method for parties to resolve 
disputes on religious terms without implicating a legal remedy.92  
Apart from these Shari‘a councils, many Imams and Islamic 
scholars who were not a part of a council provided similar services 
in private either from their homes or at local mosques, but on a 
smaller scale than compared to Shari‘a councils.93  This was a 
 
86 See Matthew Hickley, Islamic Sharia Courts in Britain are now ‘Legally 
Binding’, MAIL ONLINE, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1055764/Islamic-Shari’a-courts-Britain-legally-binding.html (reporting that Shari‘a 
courts have operated unofficially for years and are gaining momentum). 
87 See Laureve Blackstone, Courting Islam: Practical Alternatives to a Muslim 
Family Court in Ontario, 31 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 207, 218–19 (2005) (describing both 
advantages and disadvantages of Muslim arbitration tribunals); The Interfaith 
Legal Advisors Network, Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, (Paper – Third Meeting, 
Centre for Law and Religion, Cardiff University, Jan. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/networks/Muslim%20Arbitration%20Tribunal.pdf 
(explaining that prior to the emergence of the MAT in the United Kingdom, 
Shari‘a arbitration started off as unregulated, non-binding councils that were 
typically administered privately by community leaders either at a local mosque or 
from a private home, and originated as a community-derived method of dispute 
resolution shaped by the values of the community members). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See Reiss, supra note 60, at 769 (acknowledging that non-binding religious 
arbitration not only allows people to resolve disputes on their own terms, but they 
may do so efficiently and in a less adversarial environment compared to litigation, 




93 See The Interfaith Legal Advisors Network, supra note 87 (describing the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and how matters are dealt with, who the decision 
makers are, and the policies that govern). 
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noticeably different model from the IICJ where arbitration 
decisions would be binding, but subject to judicial review. 
By 2007, British Muslims had established informal Shari‘a 
courts to handle a variety of domestic disputes.94  These informal 
courts were leveraged by Muslims because the results were 
enforced by mutual agreement by the parties, and were much 
more efficient in terms of time and money.95  Further, the process 
was more amicable than the trial process, relieving the adversarial 
nature of trial, which helped preserve personal relationships 
between the parties.96 
4.1.2.  Giving People Choices—Binding Islamic Arbitration is 
Established in the United Kingdom 
In 2007, Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi established the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal.97  Shaykh Siddiqi followed the Jewish 
example of the Beit Din rabbinical court in the United Kingdom, a 
binding religious court that derived its power from the Arbitration 
Act of 1996 for over 100 years.98  He established the MAT as a 
legally binding arbitration tribunal operating under religious laws 
by similarly seeking jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act of 
 
94 See Reiss, supra note 60, at 768 (highlighting that these courts delivered 
non-binding decisions, but provided an outlet through which Muslims could 
resolve disputes through decisions based on Islamic ideologies while realizing 




97 See Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London) Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment 
/faith/article4749183.ece (noting that the rulings of the courts are enforceable 
with the full power of the judicial system through county courts or the High 
Court, unlike prior tribunals that depended on voluntary compliance by 
submitting parties). 
98 Id. (noting that the British Arbitration Act permits both the Jewish Beit Din 
courts and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal to function under British law); see also 
Reiss, supra note 60, at 765 (―Britain has allowed religious Jewish courts . . . to 
hand down decisions based on Jewish ideologies for over one hundred years.‖); 
see generally Bambach, supra note 14 (noting that the Beit Din and Jewish law has 
often held persuasive authority and respect in Western legal systems, and that the 
Beit Din derives its legal validity in the United Kingdom under the Arbitration 
Act of 1996). 
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1996.99  The Arbitration Act of 1996 was created to allow parties to 
―obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal 
without unnecessary delay or expense . . . [by] . . . agree[ing] how 
their disputes are [to be] resolved, subject only to such safeguards 
as are necessary in the public interest . . . .‖100  The England and 
Wales Court of Appeals explained in Halpern v. Halpern that 
―arbitral tribunals can and indeed should decide disputes in 
accordance with the law chosen by the parties‖ under the 
Arbitration Act of 1996.101  By operating as a tribunal, and being 
subject to the procedural and substantive provisions set forth in the 
Arbitration Act of 1996, MAT decisions are enforceable under 
British law.102  As the MAT explains on its website, it ―will operate 
within the legal framework of England and Wales thereby 
ensuring that any determination reached by MAT can be enforced 
through existing means of enforcement open to normal 
litigants.‖103  The arbitration awards are enforceable under British 
law but subject to judicial review.104 
The MAT‘s idea received powerful support from the comments 
of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, and Lord 
Phillips, the Lord Chief Justice, who acknowledged both the legal 
validity of the Shari‘a courts and the integrative role they could 
play within the British legal system.105  The Archbishop, in a 
 
99 See Reiss, supra note 60, at 761–62 (noting that the MAT may hand down 
binding decisions as long as they do not break fundamental tenants of human 
rights). 
100 See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 1(a)–(b) (U.K.) (restating and improving 
the laws pursuant to an arbitration agreement). 
101 Halpern v. Halpern, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 291, [37] (Eng.). 
102 See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 42 (U.K.) (describing enforcement of 
tribunal orders as akin to legally binding court decisions). 
103 MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/ (last visited Feb. 
14, 2012) (demonstrating that the MAT establishes its legitimacy under the 
existing British legal system, and seeks to integrate with the judiciary to allow 
parties to attain judgments that are consistent with their religious beliefs, but at 
the same time leverage the protections and values of the broader British society 
and legal system). 
104 See PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 23, available at 
http://www.matribunal.com/procedure_rules.html (describing the procedural 
rules under the MAT); see also Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §§ 66–71 (U.K.) 
(detailing the rules surrounding challenges and appeals of awards). 
105 See Lord Phillips, Lord Chief Justice of Eng. and Wales, Equality Before 
the Law, Speech at the East London Muslim Centre (July 3, 2008), 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj_equalit
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speech at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, commented that 
the incorporation of Shari‘a into the legal landscape in the United 
Kingdom was ―unavoidable‖ and called for ―transformative 
accommodation‖ through a ―scheme in which individuals retain 
the liberty to choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to 
resolve certain carefully specified matters . . . .  This may include 
aspects of marital law, the regulation of financial transactions and 
authorized structures of mediation and conflict resolution . . . .‖106  
The Lord Chief Justice further supported the Archbishop‘s 
comments by explaining that: 
It was not very radical to advocate embracing Sharia Law in 
the context of family disputes, for example, and our system 
already goes a long way towards accommodating the 
Archbishop‘s suggestion.  It is possible in this country for 
those who are entering into a contractual agreement to 
agree that the agreement shall be governed by a law other 
than English law . . . .  There is no reason why principles of 
Sharia Law, or any other religious code should not be the 
basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution.  It must be recognised, however, that any 
sanctions for a failure to comply with the agreed terms of 
the mediation would be drawn from the laws of England 
and Wales.  So far as aspects of matrimonial law are 
concerned, there is a limited precedent for English law to 
recognise aspects of religious laws, although when it comes 
to divorce this can only be effected in accordance with the 
civil law of this country.107 
In essence, the Archbishop and Lord Phillips understood the 
growing demand for the services of the MAT, and noted how the 
MAT could establish a symbiotic relationship with the judiciary in 
 
y_before_the_law_030708.pdf (articulating that Shari‘a law is a legitimate basis for 
voluntary mediation); Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop‘s 
Lecture – Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 
2008), http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1137/archbishops-
lecture-civil-and-religious-law-in-england-a-religious-perspective (expressing the 
need for ―transformative accommodation‖ to give people choices within the legal 
system to apply their religious beliefs privately, while engaging with the broader 
British legal system). 
106 Williams, supra note 105. 
107 Phillips, supra note 105, at 9. 
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regulating justice through the British system, reflective of society‘s 
values, while empowering Muslims to generate grassroots 
solutions to community issues through alternative dispute 
resolution. 
Given the negative public perception of Shari‘a law, the 
comments by the Archbishop and Lord Chief Justice sparked 
uproar within the United Kingdom.108  Many accused the 
Archbishop of proposing a separate legal system to implement 
Shari‘a in the United Kingdom.109  He received sharp criticism for 
his comments as many misinterpreted his suggestion of social 
integration and peaceful dispute resolution through 
―transformative accommodation‖110 to mean separate legal 
systems, undermining the rule of British law in the state.111  Amidst 
the negative publicity though, the Shari‘a courts have flourished, 
resolving a wide range of disputes and creating inroads for 
integrating the Muslim community with the broader British legal 
and social community.112 
 
108 See Sameer Ahmed, Recent Developments, Pluralism in British Islamic 
Reasoning: The Problem with Recognizing Islamic Law in the United Kingdom, 33 YALE 
J. INT‘L L. 491, 491 (2008) (commenting that after the Archbishop of Canterbury‘s 
comments, ―‗all hell broke loose‘‖) (quoting Noah Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 46.).  
109 See id. (quoting the director of a private British religious organization, who 
stated, ―[i]f Muslims want to live under sharia law then they are free to emigrate 
to a country where sharia law is already in operation‖); Ruth Gledhill & Philip 
Webster, Archbishop of Canterbury Argues for Islamic Law in Britain, TIMES (London), 
Feb. 8, 2008, at 1 (suggesting that the Archbishop‘s comments were intended to 
support segregating the legal system and permitting Muslims to implement their 
own law, which would undermine the British legal system). 
110 The term ―transformative accommodation‖ became a buzz phrase after 
the Archbishop of Canterbury‘s remarks.  According to Shaykh Siddiqi, this 
phrase means ―give people choices‖ in terms of private arbitration, and was not 
meant to indicate separate legal systems for various communities, undermining 
the British legal system or creating the potential for law forum shopping.  See 
Online Video: Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi, Founder, Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal Press Conference on Liberation from Forced 
Marriages (June 12, 2008), http://video.google.com/videoplay 
?docid=7263090663949480890 [hereinafter Siddiqi Press Conference]. 
111 See Gledhill & Webster, supra note 109 (highlighting instances of 
opposition across the board to the Archbishop‘s recommendations).  
112 The MAT has played an integrative role with the broader British society 
whereby Muslims are creating constructive legal solutions to dispute resolution 
that interfaces with both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  See Hirsch, supra note 4 
(contrasting the increase in non-Muslim participation in MAT proceedings with 
the growing backlash against the system); Types of Cases That We Deal With, 
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4.2. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT)—an Overview 
Although informal Shari‘a Councils existed in the United 
Kingdom for more than thirty years with sustained demand, many 
Muslims in the United Kingdom felt the need for a more formal, 
structured approach to dispute resolution according to Shari‘a 
within the context of the British legal system.113  In particular, 
Muslims felt a tribunal was necessary to address some of the 
shortcomings of the informal Councils, namely, lack of binding 
effect of resolutions, informal or varying council procedures, and 
need for arbitrators who are objectively qualified in both Islamic 
and British law, as opposed to informal community leaders.114 
With this desire emerging from within the Muslim community 
in the United Kingdom, Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi established the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in 2007115 with the stated view: 
We believe in the co-existence of both English law and 
personal religious laws.  We believe that the law of the land 
in which we live is binding upon each citizen, and we are 
not attempting to impose Shariah upon anyone.  Shariah 
does however have its place in this society where it is our 
personal and religious law.116 
The MAT can exercise jurisdiction as an arbitration tribunal over 
all civil and personal religious matters, except civil divorce 
proceedings (the MAT can handle the religious component of 
divorce to remedy ―limping marriages‖117), child custody, and 
 
MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/cases.html (last visited Feb. 
16, 2011) (listing among the disputes arbitrated by the MAT: forced marriage, 
domestic violence, family matters, commercial and debt, inheritance, and mosque 
disputes). 
113 See The Interfaith Legal Advisors Network, supra note 87 (noting that the 
Muslim community desired a system sophisticated enough to integrate within the 
British legal system which permits arbitrations to have binding effect under the 
Arbitration Act of 1996). 
114 Id. 
115 See Taher, supra note 97 (tracing the foundation of the MAT). 
116 Values and equalities of MAT, supra note 4. 
117 ―Limping marriages‖ are terminated marriages in civil law, but not yet 
considered terminated under religious law.  Limping marriages can have 
detrimental effects on Muslim women, who cannot remarry until their marriages 
are religiously annulled, and who have no recourse to state law because they have 
been civilly divorced.  This places them at the mercy of their estranged spouses, 
held captive by husbands who coerce them into accepting unfavorable terms on 
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criminal matters.118  The majority of the issues that are submitted to 
the MAT can be categorized as cases of forced marriage, domestic 
violence, family disputes, commercial and debt disputes, 
inheritance disputes, and minor community nuisance.119 
This model has demonstrated notable success and growth.  
Seven locations have been established in London, Bradford, 
Manchester, Birmingham, Nuneaton, Glasgow, and Edinburgh.120  
As of 2008, the network of tribunals adjudicated approximately 
one hundred cases, and has experienced continued growth since its 
formation.121  Notably, in 2009, due to the perception that the 
Tribunal is equitable, efficient, and effective to resolve disputes, 
there was a fifteen percent increase in the number of cases brought 
to the Tribunal which involved or were filed by non-Muslims 
regarding commercial or debt disputes involving Muslims.122 
The Tribunal has established extensive procedural rules 
through which it is governed.123  While a detailed explanation of 
the rules and procedures is beyond the scope of this Comment, 
some general details are worth noting.  The Tribunal itself must 
consist of at least one scholar of ‖Islamic Sacred Law‖ and one 
barrister or solicitor of England and Wales.124  Parties may apply to 
the High Court for judicial review of the decisions of the 
Tribunal.125  Parties may appoint representatives, and submit 
detailed oral, documentary, or other evidence relevant to a case.126  
 
financial compensation, property, and child custody.  Moreover, limping 
marriages can create complicated social, communal and religious issues where 
individuals are uncertain about the religious status of their marriages and family 
relationships, and are subjected to communal scrutiny in closely-knit, culturally 
centered communities.  For a discussion of limping marriages and the 
aforementioned complications, see Ahmed, supra note 108, at 492–93. 
118 See The Interfaith Legal Advisors Network, supra note 87 (noting the MAT 
has no jurisdiction over civil divorce, child custody, and criminal matters). 
119 Types of Cases That We Deal With, supra note 112. 
120 Taher, supra note 97. 
121 Hickley, supra note 86. 
122 See Hirsch, supra note 4 (noting that more than twenty non-Muslims chose 
to arbitrate at the MAT tribunals in 2009).   
123 See generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. (providing the MAT‘s 
procedural requirements). 
124 PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 10. 
125 PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 23; Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §§ 66-71 
(U.K.) (providing procedures for challenging arbitration awards and procedures). 
126 PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. §§ 13–14. 
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Parties are entitled to detailed notice of hearings and hearings are 
held in private unless both parties wish for a public hearing, 
subject to the Tribunal‘s discretion to limit public attendance for 
the betterment or protection of the parties involved.127  Detailed 
procedures exist for requesting a hearing, filing documents, 
withdrawing a case, and adjournment, amongst other common 
formal dispute resolution procedures.128  The Procedural Rules of 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal outlines all of the procedural 
guidelines.129 
4.3. MAT Initiative on Forced Marriages 
4.3.1.  Forced Marriages in the United Kingdom and the Flawed 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 
Forced marriages, namely marriages that involve some form of 
coercion to force one or both parties into a marriage, are a growing 
problem in the United Kingdom, particularly within the British-
Asian Muslim community.130  Statistics show that approximately 
seventy percent of marriages that take place between a British-
Asian citizen and a spouse from the Asian Sub-Continent involve 
an element of coercion against the will of the British citizen.131  
Governmental studies estimate that this occurs in three hundred 
cases per year or more.132  As a result, the United Kingdom enacted 
the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.133  This piece of 
 
127 PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. §§ 12, 17. 
128 See generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. (detailing the requirements 
and procedures of the MAT). 
129 Id. 
130 See Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, 2007, c. 20, § 1 (Eng.) 
(providing protection for ―individuals against being forced to enter into marriage 
without their free and full consent‖ in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland); 
MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 4–9 (providing a comprehensive 
overview of the sociocultural factors that create pressure on young adults to enter 
into forced marriages and proposing a practical solution through collaboration of 
the MAT with the British legal system); Dominic Casciani, Forced Marriage Plea to 
Schools, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi 
/uk_news/8129466.stm (recognizing the growing number of forced marriages 
that are being detected by teachers who observe changes in the behavior of 
students in school). 
131 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 9. 
132 Id. 
133 See Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, 2007, c. 20, § 1 (Eng.) 
(protecting individuals from marriages that are ―without their free and full 
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legislation creates a mechanism through which the victimized 
British citizen may apply to the courts for a protective order to 
avoid the forced marriage.134 
The Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 was subject to 
the criticism that although it is a step towards addressing the 
problem, community pressures, and procedural and individual 
autonomy issues, may impede the purpose of the Forced Marriage 
(Civil Protection) Act 2007.135  The Act requires the victim to apply 
for the protective order, even amidst pressure from his or her 
family and community, and within the context of cultural custom, 
issues of social status, and familial ties.136  Factors creating such 
coercion include: 
1.  Marriages that have been agreed [to] at the birth of the 
children must be fulfilled irrespective of later circumstances 
and desires of the parties; 
2.  Marriages that are dictated by the caste of the families; 
3.  Marriages that are decided by historical local friendships 
of members of the family; 
4.  Marriages that are the product of familial necessity i.e. 
the desire to settle a poorer wing of the family; 
5.  Marriages that are decided by the material aspirations 
and advancements of the parents; 
6.  Marriages that are linked to political aspirations of the 
parents either within the family or the community; 
7.  Marriages that solidify the strength of one parent‘s side 
of the family over the other; 
8.  Marriages that protect the interests of the parents in their 
ancestral agricultural farmland, by the family of the other 
spouse; [and] 
 
consent‖ and ―protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage 
without such consent‖). 
134 Id. § 63A. 
135 Forced Marriages, MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com 
/cases_forced_marriages.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (noting that placing the 
burden on a potential victim to voluntarily submit to a court will likely prevent 
remedial action from being taken due to family and communal pressure, and 
thereby asserting that increasing victims‘ confidence in a suitable forum 
necessitates a more customized solution that operates within the context of British 
Muslim communities). 
136 See Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, § 63C (Eng.); Forced Marriages, supra note 
135 (questioning whether victims will be confident enough to apply for a 
protective order given the risk of facing acts of recrimination by family members). 
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9.  Marriages that are primarily aimed at fulfilling the 
care/needs of the parents.137 
At the risk of recrimination by family and community members, 
many victims are simply coerced not to apply for the protective 
order.138  As a result, the solution presented by the Forced Marriage 
(Civil Protection) Act 2007 often fails to achieve its purpose 
because individuals are coerced or frightened into refraining from 
applying for a protective order at the risk of social, familial, and 
occasionally economic reprobation. 
4.3.2.  The MAT Initiative on Forced Marriages—Working with the 
Legal System Through Community Derived Solutions 
The MAT took the initiative to work with the British legal 
system to properly address the shortcomings of the Forced 
Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.139  The MAT initiative 
analyzes the sociocultural and legal aspects of marriages within the 
community and creates a framework to address the confidence and 
coercion issues of victims.140 
Where a victim is forced to marry a spouse from abroad, the 
MAT identifies a fundamental problem:  There is no point during 
the immigration process at which authorities can detect a forced 
marriage due to immigration procedures or pressures forcing 
victims to pretend that forced marriages are indeed consensual.141  
The MAT‘s solution is summarized as follows: 
 
137 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 5–6 (listing common 
factors that contribute to coercing individuals into forced marriages). 
138 Id. (explaining the strongly entrenched cultural beliefs and traditional 
values that explicitly or implicitly prevent a party in a forced marriage from 
voluntarily applying for a protective order). 
139 Id. at 4 (stating that the MAT is the appropriate institution to work with 
the government in addressing the issue of forced marriages, given its knowledge 
of Shari‘a, expertise in understanding sociocultural pressures on individuals, and 
its authoritative role both within the Muslim community and the judicial system). 
140 Id. at 13–18 (noting that the MAT addresses coercion in forced marriages 
by leveraging a socio-culturally and religiously-knowledgeable institution that 
can exert a counter-balancing pressure within society without triggering social 
reprimand, given the community-derived basis of its solution). 
141 Id. at 13 (discussing the MAT proposal for voluntary submission whereby 
a British citizen can choose to provide oral deposition that there was no coercion 
in the decision to marry). 
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The British citizen sponsoring a foreign spouse to settle in 
the UK will be invited by voluntary submission, to give an 
oral deposition to the Judges of MAT, satisfying them that 
the marriage he/she entered into was neither forced nor 
coerced.  The British citizen will not be forced to give this 
voluntary deposition as a legal requirement.  The voluntary 
deposition, if successful, would result in a written 
declaration from the Judges of MAT, that they were 
satisfied that the marriage entered into was without any 
force or coercion.  The British citizen can then use this 
declaration to support the application of the foreign spouse 
to settle in the UK.  If however, the foreign spouse fails to 
produce such a declaration from MAT or any other 
appropriate evidence, then it would be open for the ECO at 
the entry clearance point, to draw such inferences deemed 
appropriate as to the status of the marriage.142 
The key to this proposal turns on two factors:  (1) the voluntariness 
requirement and (2) the expertise of qualified MAT judges to 
inquire about the nature of a potential marriage, in light of social 
and cultural customs.143 
The voluntariness requirement is crucial for two reasons.  First, 
it does not encroach on any individual freedoms that force people 
into arbitration, and it is easily integrated into the existing legal 
framework regarding marriage and immigration.144  Second, an 
abstention to get a declaration from the MAT serves as a ―red flag‖ 
to immigration officials or courts hearing forced marriage cases 
under the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, creating a 
procedural mechanism to separate legitimate marriages from ones 
of coercion.145 
 
142 Id.(emphasis original). 
143 Id. at 13–14 (explaining that by creating a mechanism through which 
individuals can freely voice their concerns about a forced marriage without fear of 
social reprimand, and by constructing that mechanism on a foundation of legal 
experts trained in both religious and secular law, the MAT addresses the core fatal 
flaws of the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007). 
144 Id. (stating that the MAT solution simply builds on the current legal 
process by creating a mechanism to make the existing legal process more 
informed about the true circumstances of a possible forced marriage). 
145 Id. (explaining how the voluntary submission requirement could operate 
to more readily identify forced marriages, which could provide government 
officers and the judiciary with an additional tool to detect forced marriages). 
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The expertise of qualified MAT judges is also crucial for several 
reasons.  First, it enables inquiries to take place with the level of 
intimate knowledge required to identify coerced marriages.146  The 
judges selected for these inquiries include both British lawyers and 
religious scholars who are familiar with both the cultural customs 
of the Asian community as well as the broader multicultural 
British society in which second generation British citizens 
socialize.147  Thus, they are well equipped to interview potential 
victims by asking inquisitive questions and understanding the 
subtleties to a potential victim‘s sociocultural and personal 
circumstances, while understanding both the religious and legal 
implications for the interviewee.  Second, the MAT‘s social position 
within the British-Asian Muslim community removes any social 
backlash against potential victims because they are submitting to a 
socially acceptable and respected forum.148 
As a result, two key goals are accomplished.  First, cases of 
forced marriage can be easily identified:  either the interviewee will 
openly confess to being pressured into a marriage because the 
interviewee is in a socially safe forum, or in instances of a more 
hesitant interviewee, the judges will have the expertise to tease out 
 
146 Id. at 14 (discussing how MAT judges will approach the issue of forced 
marriage with the ―scrutiny and compassion it deserves‖). 
147 Id. (emphasizing that the qualifications of judges include the ability to 
interpret the law, as well as the ability to understand the personal issues relating 
to cultural and communal custom, thus strengthening their ability to critically 
assess the issues and risks of potential forced marriage victims). 
148 See Mona Rafeeq, Note, Rethinking Islamic Law Arbitration Tribunals: Are 
They Compatible with Traditional American Notions of Justice?, 28 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 108, 
126 (2010) (explaining that the MAT requires its arbiters to be Islamic scholars 
―deemed worthy enough to be a scholar in the community‘s eyes, in terms of both 
religious study and experience‖); Interview with Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi, Founder, 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, in Nuneaton, U.K. (Mar. 11, 2008) (explaining that 
the MAT is perceived as an acceptable forum for dispute resolution because it 
reflects the British Muslim community‘s values, has legal credibility, and is 
intimately aware of the issues prevalent in today‘s society); Online Video: Shaykh 
Faiz Siddiqi, Founder, Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Muslim Arbitration Tribunal  
Press Conference Question and Answer Session (June 12, 2008), 
http://www.matribunal.com/initiative_qa_sfs.html [hereinafter Shaykh Siddiqi 
Press Conference Q&A] (fielding questions regarding the newly formed Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal); MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 14 
(explaining that the MAT is the appropriate dispute resolution forum for 
members of the U.K. Muslim community because its officials possess a particular 
understanding and expertise in the U.K. Muslim community‘s distinct culture). 
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the facts and reality of a given situation.149  In addition, by 
identifying forced marriages, the MAT helps to create pressure on 
the community to avoid such practices, as religious scholars and 
professionals within the community articulate their disapproval of 
forced marriages.150  Because this shift in the community‘s 
perspective derives from the most respected individuals within the 
community, the community will deem views against forced 
marriages as more reliable and acceptable.151 
4.3.3.  The MAT Initiative is Easily Implemented into the Current 
Legal System and Leverages Smart Procedural Processes to 
Protect British Citizens 
The action plan implemented by the MAT to tackle the issue of 
forced marriages is extensive and well equipped to integrate with 
 
149 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 14 (stating that MAT 
professionals will possess extensive experience with evaluating forced marriages, 
which ―will give British Muslims the confidence to come forward to utilise [sic] 
the [MAT] process to its fullest potential‖); Interview with Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi, 
supra note 148 (corroborating the premise that the unique expertise of the judges 
helps distinguish cases of forced marriages from consensual marriages); Shaykh 
Siddiqi Press Conference Q&A, supra note 148 (answering questions pertaining to 
the newly formed Muslim Arbitration Tribunal). 
150 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 15–16 (outlining 
various strategies used by the MAT to discourage forced marriages within the 
community such as leveraging the involvement of appropriate community 
members as mediators, issuing written warnings, customizing advice to victims 
and involving police, and judicial/administrative authorities).  Indeed, one course 
of action by the MAT would be: 
[w]here appropriate the Judges may call upon senior members 
of the community close to the British spouse to visit his/her 
family in the UK and to allude them of the legal ramifications 
of participating or being complicit in a coerced or forced 
marriage.  
 
The aim of the visit would be to allow the perpetrators of the 
forced marriage to register the fact that their actions are now 
under social, community and legal scrutiny. It is envisaged 
that the visit of the community elder shall be a source of great 
embarrassment in itself and shall cause the perpetrators to 
avoid undue actions.   
Id. at 16. 
151 See, e.g., id. (noting that the MAT could enlist respected elders and 
professionals in the British Muslim community to admonish community members 
who continue to coerce individuals into entering and/or maintaining forced 
marriages). 
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the existing legal system and the Forced Marriage (Civil 
Protection) Act 2007.  In particular, the MAT documented detailed 
methods of risk assessment for individuals, formed national and 
local working groups, and conducted in-depth training for various 
community and legal participants (including Imams, Muslim 
scholars, Members of Parliament, Local Councilors, police officers, 
civil servants, and social workers).152  As a result, the MAT has 
developed a comprehensive system—attuned to the religious, 
social and cultural needs within the community—that is well 
integrated with the broader British society and British citizens‘ 
needs.153  Furthermore, the MAT solution has been well received 
by the British government and legal community, and has been 
endorsed by Justice Minister Lord Hunt.154 
The procedural format allows British citizens to escape forced 
marriages without backlash from families or community.155  It 
creates a religiously acceptable method of escaping cultural 
practices that force both women and men into making undesirable 
decisions.  The MAT solution works collaboratively with the 
British legal system, creating a channel for substantive engagement 
with the broader legal system.156  Finally, the solution provides 
 
152 Id. at 22–27 (outlining a comprehensive and collaborative action plan, 
which includes involving community members, social workers, law enforcement, 
and the judiciary system, thereby integrating the Muslim community with the 
broader British social fabric). 
153 Id. at 13–18 (describing a framework that requires MAT arbiters to both 
interpret law and understand the intimate issues relating to cultural and 
communal custom within the context of British society in order for them to 
optimally assess the issues and risks of potential forced marriage victims); 
Interview with Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi, supra note 148 (corroborating that MAT 
judges‘ particular expertise help them effectively distinguish between cases of 
forced marriages from consensual marriages); Shaykh Siddiqi Press Conference 
Q&A, supra note 148.  See also supra note 140 and accompanying text (detailing 
ways in which the MAT‘s cultural and religious expertise help address issues 
such as confidence and coercion when dealing with marital arbitration amongst 
English Muslims). 
154 See, e.g., Online Video: Lord Philip Hunt, supra note 4 (endorsing the 
MAT‘s efforts to combat forced marriage). 
155 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 14–16 (noting 
procedures designed to minimize social backlash amongst parties participating 
before the MAT). 
156 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 13–16 (outlining 
procedures whereby MAT participants can avoid ostracism by their family or 
community for seeking formal legal channels but also noting that the MAT may 
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judicial oversight over tribunals which might otherwise operate 
with sub-standard judges and unfair rulings motivated by cultural 
customs.157  The MAT accomplishes this through its integration 
with the existing legal system; sophisticated training of judges, 
religious scholars, and stakeholders; educational and professional 
requirements for tribunal composition; and its constant awareness 
of both cultural and modern social circumstances within the 
community and society at large.158 
5. ANALYZING THE POLICY CONCERNS ARTICULATED AGAINST THE 
IICJ IN LIGHT OF THE MAT EXAMPLE 
By analyzing the concerns raised in Ontario regarding the IICJ 
in light of the example of the MAT, it is clear that the concerns 
raised by various interest groups against the IICJ constitute either 
inaccurate assumptions about religious arbitration or issues that 
can be alleviated by structuring the tribunal appropriately. 
5.1. Remedying Gender Bias Through Clearly Defined Values, 
Informed Judges, Balanced Tribunal Composition, Carefully 
Crafted Jurisdiction, and Religious Education 
As noted earlier, the most common objection to religious 
arbitration is the alleged imbalance of power between men and 
women.159  The MAT demonstrates how the IICJ could properly 
address this issue.  Its composition, expertise, and value system 
speak directly to the issue.  The MAT notes that it is not merely a 
group of recently immigrated ―Imams sitting in a mosque‖ 
(describing a typical stereotype for patriarchal, gender-biased 
figureheads) nor is it biased against women, but rather, that it is 
 
involve the English judicial system or authorities for violations of English laws 
prohibiting forced marriages). 
157 See PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 23 (providing that even though 
decisions of the tribunal are final, the ―rule shall not prevent any party applying 
for Judicial Review with permission of the High Court‖). 
158 See supra notes 152, 154, 156 and accompanying text (enumerating how the 
MAT integrates with the English legal system and remains keenly aware of the 
Muslim community‘s particular nuances including through employing officials 
with relevant expertise). 
159 See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 13, at 48. (noting that an opposition group to the 
IICJ argues that Muslim family law ―perpetuate[s] a patriarchal model‖). 
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well-informed about the needs of women and young people.160  
The tribunals are composed of British lawyers, many of them 
young and of both genders.161  The MAT explicitly states that ―[t]o 
promote harmony, we intend to provide female lawyers to sit as 
the legally qualified member as often as possible.  There will be no 
race or sex discrimination in this organisation!‖162 
These values are reflected in the MAT‘s initiative on forced 
marriages, a problem that disproportionately affects young British 
Muslim women.163  By considering the sociocultural issues that 
affect women caught in coercive marriages, the MAT defends 
precisely the rights of women that many interest groups claimed 
would be at risk in the context of the IICJ.164  Not only does the 
MAT provide communal and legal solutions tailored to the needs 
of women and young people, it does so through mechanisms that 
are sensitive to the same communal and familial pressures that 
cause concern for interest groups in Ontario.165  Issues such as 
 
160 See Values and Equalities of MAT, supra note 4 (explaining that the tribunal 
comprises of members who are well versed in the sociocultural issues its 
community members face, and that coupled with its religious and secular legal 
expertise, it can resolve issues in a manner that sufficiently addresses the needs of 
women and young people). 
161 Id. (―[W]e will have young qualified people, male and female, sitting as 
members of the Arbitration Tribunal.‖).  See also PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 
10 (requiring tribunals to be composed of both Islamic scholars and English 
lawyers). 
162 Id. (emphasizing the MAT‘s commitment to equality and women‘s rights). 
163 See Need to Know:  Forced Marriage (Teachers TV broadcast Jan. 5, 2009, 
distributed under license by the Department of Education, United Kingdom and 
is Crown Copyrighted), available at http://www.tes.co.uk/teaching-
resource/Teachers-TV-Forced-Marriages-6047638/ (explaining the various 
sociocultural pressures that young women are subjected to in forced marriages, 
the sociocultural implications and underpinnings of forced marriage, and the 
resulting violation of their basic human rights, as well as how the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal helps address these specific issues with educated and 
culturally aware jurists that work alongside the current British legal system). 
164 Id. (explaining how the MAT is aware of the various sociocultural 
pressures victims face in the context of forced marriage, and its ability to exercise 
communal pressure, educate families about the consequences and religious 
implications of their actions, and to work within the context of the existing legal 
framework to give potential victims choices where they can voluntarily submit to 
the tribunal for help after informed consent without being subjected to familial or 
communal repercussions). 
165 See, e.g., MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 14–16 (describing 
the MAT‘s approach to curbing forced marriages through leveraging socio-
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voluntariness and fear of social reprimand are alleviated through 
the informed, structured, consultative, and integrated approach the 
MAT utilizes in its detailed procedural rules.166 
Further, the MAT‘s structure still protects various civil rights 
and freedoms of Muslims in the West.  For example, the MAT lacks 
jurisdiction to resolve civil divorce and child custody issues, and 
its decisions are subject to judicial review on appeal.167  However, 
by handling domestic violence and family dispute issues, the MAT 
is able to engage in preventative dispute resolution to preserve 
relationships and prevent divorces or family breakdown.168  
Further, in the case of ―limping-marriages,‖ where a couple is 
civilly divorced but one spouse claims that they are not religiously 
divorced, the MAT provides a forum to complete the religious 
divorce and plays an active role in the peaceful resolution of 
disputes in a manner that is less vulnerable to negative community 
scrutiny.169  As a result, the MAT demonstrates a workable model 
 
culturally, religiously knowledgeable legal and religious experts, thereby 
cultivating a framework better attuned to address communal and family 
pressures in the British Muslim community).  The MAT outlines various 
strategies, such as liaising with legal authorities, involving various community 
mediators, educating families, and exerting various other forms of communal 
pressure to fight against forced marriage).  Id. at 13–18.  See also Interview with 
Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi, supra note 148 (corroborating that the unique expertise of the 
judges, the MAT‘s detailed procedural guidelines, and the role of the MAT within 
the community can help ensure individuals voluntarily submit to the tribunal on 
an informed basis, without fear of social or familial reprimand); Shaykh Siddiqi 
Press Conference Q&A, supra note 148 (fielding questions regarding the newly 
formed Muslim Arbitration Tribunal); see also generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. 
TRIB. (providing a detailed description of the procedural rules of the MAT that 
help ensure voluntary submission and informed consent). 
166 See generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. (providing detailed rules 
governing the MAT‘s arbitration process which are tailored to provide sufficient 
cultural sensitivity to reduce individuals‘ fear of social or community reprimand 
for engaging in marital arbitration before the MAT). 
167 See The Interfaith Legal Advisors Network, supra note 87, at 3 (indicating 
that section 23 of the Procedural Rules for the MAT allows parties to apply for 
judicial review with permission of the High Court).   
168 See Reiss, supra note 60, at 768 (noting that non-binding Shari‘a-based 
arbitrations possess the advantage that they are ―‗more amicable than the trial 
process, thus helping to better preserve the relationship between the parties‘‖) 
(quoting ALBERT K. FIADJOE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A DEVELOPING 
WORLD PERSPECTIVE 27 (2004)).   
169 See Ahmed, supra note 108, at 492–93 (explaining that limping marriages, 
where individuals are uncertain about the religious status of their marriages and 
family relationships, raise complicated social, communal, and religious questions 
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for the IICJ, in which procedural mechanisms and carefully crafted 
jurisdiction permit religious arbitration to supplement and 
enhance the secular legal system.   
Finally, the MAT plays an active role in educating the Muslim 
and broader British community about the true nature of Shari‘a 
law by dispelling myths that evolve through the conflation of 
religious law with cultural customs.  The MAT explains:   
The judges of MAT have come across many situations 
during the course of cases presented to them, where they 
have had to clarify the dichotomy between Islamic Laws 
and national cultures.  For example, in the cases of domestic 
violence, there have been instances where the offender has 
submitted that the said course of action [(for example, 
disciplining one‘s wife, forced marriage, or limitations on a 
women‘s right to terminate a marriage)] was permitted 
under Islamic Law.  The Judges of MAT have been efficient 
in sifting the myth from reality.170   
In the case of forced marriages, the MAT explains clearly that, 
―forced or coerced marriages have no foundations in Islamic Law 
and shall be nullified under the edicts of Islamic tenets.‖171  Thus, 
the MAT demonstrates how an institution like the IICJ has the 
potential to dispel myths about Shari‘a, and play a constructive 
role within the framework of domestic law to protect the rights of 
women through religiously and communally acceptable 
mechanisms.   
5.2. Ensuring Informed Consent, Particularly by Individuals of 
Limited Education or of Foreign Backgrounds 
A second common concern raised by opponents to the IICJ was 
the potential for individuals of limited education or of foreign 
 
for English Muslims); see also Talal Youssef Eid, Marriage, Divorce, and Child 
Custody as Experienced by American Muslims: Religious, Social, and Legal 
Considerations 261–69 (May 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
Divinity School) (on file with Harvard University Library) (describing the 
complicated overlap of Shari‘a marriage law with civil divorces and emphasizing 
the utility of coordinating the two processes to remedy limping marriages, 
especially when social and communal pressures bind Muslims to marriages they 
have civilly terminated).   
170 MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 4.   
171 Id.   
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backgrounds to unwittingly agree to religious arbitration when 
they are inadvertently caught in abusive or coerced marriages 
without recourse to equitable dispute resolution.172  The MAT 
example, again, demonstrates various safeguards against these 
concerns.  First, the detailed procedural rules of MAT provide 
safeguards which help ensure that parties submit to arbitration 
with informed consent, and require documents to be written in a 
language that all parties can understand and consent to.173  This 
means all parties should be sufficiently informed by the Tribunal‘s 
judges about their rights when submitting to religious arbitration.  
The Tribunal must facilitate effective communication in a party‘s 
preferred language to ensure that all parties are sufficiently able to 
communicate and be informed when consenting to arbitration and 
throughout the arbitration process.174  Second, the MAT‘s decisions 
are subject to judicial review, and thus provide parties with 
protection from decisions that are either biased, discriminatory, or 
a violation of human rights.175  Arbitration decisions may not 
violate ―fundamental tenets of the Human Rights Act, and the 
rights of women must be respected.‖176  Third, its initiatives on 
forced marriages take steps to prevent coercive marriages from 
being formed even before disputes potentially arise from 
foreseeable high-risk forced marriages.177  As such, the MAT model 
not only demonstrates a method of handling the issues of informed 
 
172 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50 (explaining that it is not uncommon for a 
Canadian Muslim to return to his country of origin for marriage where standards 
of consent differ from Canada, resulting in difficulty for women to invalidate 
marital agreements).   
173 See PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. §§ 2, 3, 12, 14, 15 (outlining the 
procedure for requesting a hearing, filing documents and evidence, notification, 
admission of evidence, and language requirements for all documents).   
174 See id. §§ 12, 15 (providing that the Tribunal ―must serve notice of the 
date, time, and place of the hearing on every party‖ and all documents must be 
submitted in English, or accompanied by an English translation).   
175 See id. § 23 (―No appeal shall be made against any decisions of the 
Tribunal.  This rule shall not prevent any party applying for Judicial Review with 
permission of the High Court.‖).   
176 Reiss, supra note 60, at 762 (quoting Church of Scotland Backs Islamic Sharia 
Law Courts, SCOTSMAN, Oct. 10, 2008, http://news.scotsman.com/scotland 
/Church-of-Scotland-backs-Islamic.4578904.jp).  
177 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 13–14 (suggesting that 
avoiding the MAT tends to imply a sham or problem marriage warranting 
intervention by the British government, thereby demonstrating that MAT may 
help detect and prevent involuntary or coerced marriages).  
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consent and procedural fairness in the context of religious 
arbitration when disputes arise, but the model can even further be 
used as a preventative mechanism to avoid issues from occurring 
at all.  Fourth, by narrowly tailoring the jurisdiction of MAT, the 
MAT plays a constructive role in resolving family disputes, 
addressing domestic violence, and creating religiously and 
communally acceptable forums for marriage termination or 
reconciliation, while supporting the court system‘s jurisdiction 
over divorce and child custody.178  The MAT demonstrates the 
positive role that a sophisticated institution with well-planned 
jurisdiction, procedural rules, and management could play for 
Muslims in Ontario to resolve family disputes in the context of 
Ontario law, while addressing the rights and freedoms that 
opponents of the IICJ are concerned about. 
5.3. Transformative Accommodation, Giving People Choices—
Deriving Voluntariness Through Equity and Religious Values   
Another major concern articulated by opponents of the IICJ 
was whether participation in religious arbitration, especially by 
women, would actually be voluntary, and whether there would be 
an unfair balance of power during religious arbitrations.179  
Although people may be completely informed about their rights, it 
was suggested that people, especially women, submit to religious 
arbitration out of fear of social or familial backlash, having 
devastating impacts on their personal relationships, physical and 
 
178 See Types of Cases That We Deal With, supra note 112 (listing the cases that 
the MAT addresses, including forced marriages, domestic violence, and family 
disputes); PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. §§ 1, 23 (explaining the types of disputes 
and methods of dispute resolution the MAT provides, and the methods parties 
may use to appeal to the High Court); The Interfaith Legal Advisors Network, 
supra note 87, at 1 (describing the origins of informal ―Shariah Councils‖ as a way 
to apply Shari‘a law to ―family and personal law‖); Values and Equalities of MAT, 
supra note 4 (explaining the necessity for judges of the Arbitration Tribunal to be 
well acquainted with relevant social, cultural, and gender issues); Rafeeq, supra 
note 148, at 124–25 (explaining that the composition of the tribunal helps establish 
a dispute resolution forum that is acceptable to the British Muslim community). 
179 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50–51 (summarizing arguments against the IICJ, 
including certain criticisms of Islamic law‘s treatment of women); Wolfe, supra 
note 57, at 463–64 (questioning whether women will be able to truly voluntarily 
consent to religious arbitration amidst social and familial pressure).   
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emotional well-being, as well as economic livelihood.180  Framing 
the IICJ in the context of MAT, again, addresses these issues. 
The MAT has defined itself as a communally acknowledged 
and acceptable forum for religious arbitration that is well informed 
about the issues unique to the cultural demographic within the 
context of Western society that it typically serves.181  The MAT 
utilizes procedural rules and requirements to objectively protect 
the rights of all parties involved, while maintaining religious 
authority in its decisions.182  For example, the requirements that 
tribunals be composed of both legal and religious scholars who are 
well informed about social issues and the commitment to female 
lawyer participation help balance the distribution of power 
between genders.  The procedural guidelines required for consent 
to arbitration, language requirements for consent, documentation 
and evidence, a party‘s right to appoint representatives, and 
private arbitration settings with the option of public forum183 all 
help to ensure that a person submitting to the MAT is well 
informed and enjoys a balance of power, while being protected 
from social reprimand within his community.  Quite contrary to 
the suggested premise by opponents of the IICJ, a religious 
arbitration tribunal can create a forum that protects both men and 
women within their sociocultural contexts precisely because of the 
religious authority of the tribunals.184  The religious nature and 
 
180 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 50–51 (noting concern regarding whether 
women consent to arbitration by their own free will versus succumbing to the 
social pressure of adhering to religious traditions); see also MUSLIM ARBITRATION 
TRIBUNAL, supra 63, at 5–9 (underlining the high occurrence of coerced or forced 
marriages in Muslim cultures, which often stem from certain cultural traditions 
and rituals, as opposed to religious laws and beliefs); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 461, 
463–64 (explaining that various sociocultural, communal, familial, and economic 
forces can inhibit individuals from exercising their autonomy when presented 
with family or personal law disputes).   
181 See PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 10 (requiring tribunals to be 
composed of both legal and religious experts); Values and Equalities of MAT, supra 
note 4 (highlighting the necessity for arbitrators to be both familiar and sensitive 
to the social, cultural, and gender issues presented, which can be accomplished by 
having ―young qualified people, male and female, sitting as members of the 
Arbitration Tribunal‖). 
182 See generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. (stating the procedural rules 
maintained by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal). 
183 Id. 
184 See generally Rafeeq, supra note 148 (discussing how a Muslim arbitration 
system can be reconciled in the cultural context of ―American notions of justice‖); 
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communal derivation of the tribunals drive acceptance of the 
forum in the communities within which they operate.185  By 
establishing a communally accepted dispute resolution forum that 
simultaneously protects the rights of individuals in a socially 
relevant context while leveraging its role as a religiously 
authoritative forum, the MAT example alleviates both the fear of 
unfair decisions on the one hand, and communal reprimand on the 
other, thereby promoting voluntary submission by prospective 
parties.186  If the IICJ were to be modeled similarly to the MAT, 
previously expressed concerns about voluntary submission to 
arbitration would disintegrate. 
5.4. Maintaining Judicial Authority and Responsibility Through 
Judicial Review and Public Scrutiny 
A final major concern articulated by opponents to religious 
arbitration in Ontario is the argument of the judiciary ―washing its 
hands‖ of family law disputes via arbitration, the lack of public 
scrutiny of decisions, and the potential procedural roadblocks, like 
the busy schedules of arbitrators.187  Again, the MAT serves as a 
model that the IICJ could replicate to address these concerns.  The 
MAT‘s decisions are subject to judicial review, although in limited 
circumstances.188  Nonetheless, these circumstances do prevent 
 
Interview with Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi, supra note 148 (explaining that the MAT is 
perceived as an acceptable forum for dispute resolution because it is reflective of 
the British Muslim community‘s values, has legal credibility, and is intimately 
aware of the issues prevalent in today‘s society); Shaykh Siddiqi Press Conference 
Q&A, supra note 148 (fielding questions regarding the newly formed Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal). 
185 See generally Rafeeq, supra note 148, at 112 (arguing that ―arbitration 
tribunals using new interpretations of Shari‘a can be effectively implemented, 
provided that they are appropriately restricted‖). 
186 See infra Sections 4.2, 4.3.2–3.3 for analysis on the necessity of 
voluntariness and informed consent from parties submitting to the MAT, the 
importance of the expertise of the MAT judges, the values of the MAT, the 
position of the MAT within its community, and the effects of the MAT within its 
community, as highlighted by its efforts to tackle the forced marriage problem in 
the United Kingdom. 
187 BOYD, supra note 13, at 33. 
188 See PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 23 (stating that while the Tribunal 
decisions are not appealable, the parties are not barred from applying for Judicial 
Review ―with permission of the High Court‖); Reiss, supra note 60, at 762 (stating 
that under the Arbitration Act, Shari‘a courts ―must not preclude recourse‖ to 
regular courts). 
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unconscionable or illegal decisions from being rendered.189  
Secondly, the detailed voluntariness requirement helps ensure a 
degree of public scrutiny.  If decisions consistently bias a particular 
gender or are consistently unfair in a noticeable way, people 
simply will not voluntarily submit to the MAT (or in the context of 
Ontario, the IICJ) for an objective forum for dispute resolution.  
Especially given the role that the MAT has grown into in its local 
communities, the MAT‘s constituents become aware of the fairness 
or lack thereof of its decisions.190  Consequently, the voluntary 
nature of the tribunals (in light of judicial review and sociocultural, 
communal, and religious nuances making the forum acceptable to 
its constituents) helps avoid undesirable decisions.  Naturally, 
parties who would submit to the IICJ for dispute resolution would 
leverage the same public scrutiny of the MAT.191  Finally, given the 
structured procedural guidelines,192 resources, and cost structure of 
the MAT, it is clear that a workable model can address potential 
cost and time efficiency issues, from which the IICJ would 
similarly benefit.  
 
6. ADDITIONAL PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE IICJ,  
BASED ON THE MAT EXAMPLE 
Beyond resolving the major concerns of the IICJ‘s opponents, 
there are five crucial public policy justifications for permitting 
religious arbitration in Ontario clearly identifiable in the MAT 
example.  First, institutionalized religious arbitration helps prevent 
continued unregulated and possibly unconscionable arbitration in 
Ontario.193  Second, it can help shape communities and relieve 
 
189 See Reiss, supra note 60, at 761–62 (discussing three standards that the 
tribunal‘s decisions have to meet in order to be considered ―binding under the 
Arbitration Act‖). 
190 See Rafeeq, supra note 148, at 125 (explaining how the MAT does not 
advertise and has established its credibility and functions within the community 
―by word of mouth‖). 
191 Id. (noting that the MAT relies on word of mouth, rather than 
conventional advertising, to bring in new cases, making public support for their 
decisions very crucial). 
192 See generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB.  
193 See Shari’a in the West—Whose Law Counts Most?, supra note 62, at 62 
(explaining that many Muslims still submit to non-binding arbitration often 
administered informally, which defeats the purpose of the ban on arbitration of 
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cultural baggage that Muslims face when reconciling their identity 
in a Western society.194  Third, religious arbitration can help 
integrate the Muslim community with broader society amidst a 
time of socio-political tension.195  Finally, the remaining fourth and 
fifth justifications are the typical dual benefits of any other type of 
arbitration, namely, (1) cost and time efficiency to remedy disputes 
in a non-adversarial environment, which (2) helps salvage and 
repair personal relationships, particularly where religious values 
are infused or underlie the dispute.196 
 
family law issues in Ontario).  Shari‘a is often misinterpreted or conflated with 
cultural customs and practices.  See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §§ 66–71 (U.K.) 
(demonstrating that judicial review can be implemented to act as a safeguard 
against unregulated religious arbitration); PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB. § 23 
(stating that parties are not barred from seeking Judicial Review); MUSLIM 
ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 4 (stating the MAT judges have needed to 
separate myth from reality in explaining Shari‘a law).  For a list of the beneficial 
judicial constraints imposed on arbitration tribunals by courts in the United 
Kingdom, see Rafeeq, supra note 148, at 127–28 (including in the list of benefits: 
courts ―may refuse an application to stay legal proceedings brought against a 
party . . . unless [the court] is convinced that the [arbitration] agreement is valid‖; 
courts have the ability to remove the ―arbitrator on grounds of bias, lack of 
qualification or physical or mental capacity‖; courts have the ability to ―decide 
questions of law‖ that ―affect the magnitude of awards‖ or ―substantially affects 
the rights of one or more of the parties‖; and courts have the ability to set aside 
awards upon application for review by a party in arbitration). 
194 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining that 
many issues that conflate cultural customs with religion within the Muslim 
community can be addressed through socioculturally aware jurists providing 
reconciliatory rulings in arbitration); Brown, supra note 10, at 544 (explaining that 
religious arbitration in Ontario would allow Muslims to maintain their identity, 
yet be subject to procedural safeguards of conscionability).  See generally Faisal 
Bhabha, Between Exclusion and Assimilation:  Experimentalizing Multiculturalism, 54 
MCGILL L.J. 45 (2009) (opining generally that the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms‘ multiculturalism provisions provide a legal framework for minorities 
to reconcile their identity within the context of Ontario‘s broader social values). 
195 See Aslam, supra note 3, at 875 (explaining that the IICJ would enable the 
Ontario government to respect ―the rights of its religious citizens to structure 
certain aspects of their lives according to their beliefs, a compromise that will 
facilitate the participation of Canadian Muslims as valued members in democratic 
politics‖).  This is a similar sentiment to the progress of the MAT in engaging with 
various stakeholders within society.  MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 
63, at 20–27 (outlining a comprehensive collaborative system involving 
community members, social workers, law enforcement, and the judiciary system, 
thereby integrating the Muslim community into the broader British social fabric). 
196 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 36–38 (stating that arbitration facilitates creative 
dispute resolution in an efficient and cost effective manner while providing a 
healing element to the community through non-adversarial proceedings). 
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6.1. Preventing Unmonitored Arbitration and Abuse of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Within Closed Cultural Communities 
One primary justification for institutionalizing binding 
religious arbitration and integrating it with the broader legal 
landscape is that it prevents unmonitored arbitration and helps 
protect against abuse of alternative dispute resolution methods.  
The IICJ‘s opponents correctly pointed out that there is a real risk 
of people being coerced into arbitration or subject to inappropriate 
decisions.197  This risk is especially concerning where arbitration 
tribunals are held in private, unregulated settings that lack 
procedural structure and are administered by unqualified 
arbitrators.198  Although such tribunals may be non-binding, they 
may be submitted to by parties for the cultural and social concerns 
IICJ opponents often articulate, namely, fear of social reprimand, 
lack of knowledge, and religious pressure.199  Evidence shows that 
in Ontario, despite the ban on religious arbitration, people 
informally seek advice on family law disputes from religious 
advisors.200  This practice has led to an increased number of 
women (and Muslims in general) being subjected to communal 
pressure and inequitable or even dangerous rulings that result 
from a misinterpretation of Islamic Law or are derived from 
patriarchal cultural customs.201 
By institutionalizing religious arbitration tribunals, the 
government can ensure a sufficient level of control and protection 
of an individual‘s rights and freedoms.202  The procedural rules 
and requirements for operating a system like the MAT, and its 
members‘ unique combination of knowledge and training, create a 
 
197 See supra Sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3 for discussions on the inherent 
inequity between men and women in unregulated religious arbitration, the risk of 
lack of voluntary submission to religious arbitration, and the risk of lack of 
informed consent to religious arbitration, respectively. 
198 Id.; see also Shari’a in the West—Whose Law Counts Most?, supra note 62 
(explaining that many Muslims still submit to non-binding arbitration often 
administered informally, which defeats the purpose of the ban on arbitration of 




202 See discussion in supra note 193 (describing judicial safeguards that are 
made available if arbitrational tribunals are institutionalized). 
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forum which is optimal for religious arbitration.203  The religious 
and communally derived nature of these tribunals alleviates the 
sociocultural and religious concerns of Muslims.204  Further, 
because the forum is a source of community-derived religious 
justice, the community will feel empowered, which will foster a 
feeling of participation in the legal system that will promote social 
integration.205  Finally, the necessity for such tribunals to operate 
within the context of the domestic law and be subject to judicial 
review establishes a degree of government involvement and 
protection that would otherwise be impossible to establish in 
current informal Shari‘a councils.206 
6.2. Shaping Communities and Reconciling Cultural Baggage Through 
Religious Arbitration 
A second benefit of religious arbitration in Ontario is the ability 
for institutionalized religious arbitration to play a formative role in 
communities.  For example, the MAT acknowledges and addresses 
sociocultural issues that are promulgated under the guise of 
religion.  These issues, such as abuse of women, forced marriage, 
domestic violence implicating children, patriarchal communities 
and the like, are usually derived from cultural customs from South 
Asia and the Middle East and are conflated with religion.207  As the 
MAT example shows, institutionalized religious arbitration has the 
potential to reconcile these issues in a constructive forum 
recognized by the Muslim community.208  This potential is clearly 
demonstrated by the MAT‘s initiative on forced marriages and its 
institutional commitments to recognizing the rights of women and 
empowering them through the tribunal system, both as judges and 
as parties. 
 
203 See discussion and sources cited supra note 178 (discussing how Shari‘a 
councils like the MAT are structured and their resulting ability to create 
acceptable resolutions for Muslim disputants living in non-Muslim countries). 
204 See discussion and sources cited supra note 186. 
205 See id. 
206 See discussion and sources cited supra note 193. 
207 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 5 (detailing the 
influence of the Asian subcontinent‘s culture on marriage). 
208 See supra textual paragraph and quotation accompanying note 170 
(arguing that the MAT can effectively allay myths about religious law and 
decouple cultural baggage from religious practices via its position within the 
communities in which it operates). 
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Because Muslims would recognize the authority of the IICJ in 
Ontario, the organization could effectively shape the views and 
education of its community members regarding the differences 
between cultural customs and Islamic Law—much like the MAT 
does today. 
6.3. Leveraging Religious Arbitration Tribunals to Promote Social 
Integration 
Apart from segregating cultural baggage, religious arbitration 
tribunals present a mechanism for social integration of the 
minority Muslim community into the broader society in Ontario.  
The United Kingdom example again presents evidence of this 
positive impact on communities.  For example, non-Muslims are 
initiating an increasing percentage of the cases brought to the 
MAT209 because it is regarded as an equitable and efficient method 
of dispute resolution.  Further, the MAT has been endorsed and 
recognized for its initiatives by the British government and legal 
community, receiving the endorsement of Lord Hunt Justice 
Minister.210  The participation of the non-Muslim community 
underscores the role that religious arbitration tribunals can play in 
establishing positive relationships with the rest of society.  These 
positive relationships, and integration of Muslims with the rest of 
society through collaborative legal solutions, help avoid the risk of 
Muslims becoming an insular minority.211  If the IICJ were to take a 
similar approach, it too could help prevent Muslims in Ontario 
from becoming an insular minority. 
Further, the existence of the MAT encourages the Muslim 
minority in the United Kingdom to engage and participate in the 
British legal system, promoting positive social contributions within 
what have historically been closed communities.  Through such a 
tribunal system, the community participates in the legal system 
 
209 See Hirsch, supra note 4 (noting that non-Muslims are utilizing the MAT as 
a dispute resolution forum for commercial cases involving Muslims, presumably 
because the forum is equitable and effective). 
210 See Online Video: Lord Philip Hunt, supra note 4 (endorsing the MAT and 
its initiatives). 
211 See MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 20–27 (outlining a 
system which incorporates existing English institutions and services with the 
MAT, thereby helping integrate the Muslim community with the broader British 
society). 
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through a community derived solution and leverages it as a 
positive contribution to broader British society.212  The IICJ would 
likely accomplish these contributions to its society in Ontario by 
modeling itself after the MAT. 
Finally, for young Muslims in western countries facing severe 
identity issues due to being both Western and part of an ethnic 
minority, religious arbitration tribunals can play a reconciliation 
role within its constituent communities.  As shown by the MAT 
example, such tribunals can help separate cultural baggage from 
religious principles in an integrative method with the rest of 
society, thereby helping young people feel a part of their domestic 
society while remaining true to their cultural and religious roots.213  
Similarly, the IICJ would be able to replicate this effect on Muslim 
youth in Ontario to assist them in reconciling their own identity 
ambiguities. 
6.4. Cost and Time Efficiencies, While Eliminating Adversarial 
Litigation 
Two final positive considerations are worth mentioning, 
namely, the time and cost efficiency achieved by religious 
arbitration tribunals and the reconciliation effects in relationships 
derived from alternative dispute resolution.  As demonstrated by 
the MAT, detailed procedural rules drastically expedite the 
arbitration process, as compared to the litigation process.214  In 
addition, costs can be kept quite low, compared to the much more 
 
212 This is a particularly important positive benefit where minority groups 
often find it difficult to have an impact on society‘s institutions and are subject to 
―neutral rules‖ that may not be neutral in practice.  See JEFF SPINNER, THE 
BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP (1994) (discussing the problem of neutral rules and the 
need for pluralistic integration). 
213  See supra textual paragraph and quotation accompanying note 170 
(explaining how the MAT dispels myths about religious law, and decouples 
cultural baggage from religious practices through its position in the communities 
it operates within); MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, supra note 63, at 11, 14 
(explaining that the tribunal has intimate knowledge of the sociocultural issues its 
community members face, as well as religious and secular legal expertise, 
enabling it to sufficiently address the needs of women and young people). 
214 See generally PROC. RULES MUSLIM ARB. TRIB.; see also Reiss, supra note 60, at 
768 (acknowledging that religious arbitration is efficient and less adversarial 
compared to litigation). 
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expensive process of litigation.215  Further, given that the parties 
voluntarily submit to arbitration, the process tends to be less 
adversarial, with arbitrators playing a neutral, facilitative role in 
enabling communication and settling disputes.216  Especially in the 
religious arbitration context, judges who are well-oriented with the 
sociocultural and religious issues afflicting the parties are uniquely 
able to diffuse adversarial emotions and facilitate constructive 
conflict resolution tailored to the parties‘ lifestyle and cultural 
norms within their Western social context.217  This can provide a 
less emotionally taxing experience for the parties involved, which 
increases the potential for amicable and constructive relationships 
to be salvaged during religious arbitration.218 
7. CONCLUSION 
After analyzing the historical legal roots of religious arbitration 
in Ontario and the progress of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in 
the United Kingdom, a case can easily be made that the fears about 
permitting religious arbitration in Ontario according to Islamic 
Law were overblown and that the practice should be permitted.  
There is ample evidence that many of the fears about Shari‘a were 
motivated by patriarchal views of Islam and misconceptions about 
Shari‘a.  The legislative decisions by the McGuinty Government to 
prohibit religious arbitration of family law disputes was motivated 
by the views of various interest groups, despite initial support 
from the results of government investigations and legal validity 
under the Constitution. 
Some concerns by critics, although valid, are easily solved by 
drawing from the best practices of the MAT.  These best practices 
include comprehensive procedural rules that assure parties are 
voluntarily consenting to religious arbitration on an informed 
 
215 See BOYD, supra note 13, at 36 (noting the benefits of arbitration including 
the reduced cost compared to traditional court adjudication); see also Hirsch, supra 
note 4 (referring to an MAT spokesmen‘s claim that the MAT offers effective 
service at a cheap rate). 
216 See id. at 37 
217 See id.; see also Reiss, supra note 60, at 768 (explaining the positive effects of 
religious arbitration, including cost savings, time efficiencies, and increased 
chances of salvaging and rebuilding personal relationships); supra notes 139, 147 
(noting the importance of the religious and sociocultural expertise of the MAT‘s 
jurists). 
218 See Reiss, supra note 60, at 768. 
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basis, judicial review, and accommodation of language barriers.  If 
tribunals are equipped with qualified experts who are well aware 
of sociocultural circumstances and tribunals are given the 
appropriate substantive jurisdiction, an institution like the IICJ 
could not only circumvent the worries of its opponents, but could 
also help integrate the Muslim population into the broader Ontario 
social fabric.  This process is furthered by integrative training for 
all stakeholders in the legal system from Imams to law 
enforcement and social workers, as demonstrated by the MAT 
example. 
Furthermore, binding religious arbitration, when regulated 
effectively, can prevent ethnic minorities from becoming insular 
communities.  Binding religious arbitration creates a relationship 
between community and governmental institutions, enabling 
members of the religious community to resolve disputes according 
to their religious beliefs with a feeling of ownership over solutions, 
while acting within the boundaries of government and integrating 
into broader society.  This binding effect helps to prevent 
haphazard non-binding dispute resolution from continuing in 
private circles under the radar of government regulation.  In 
addition, such an organization in Ontario can play a leading role in 
providing the subtle and intricate knowledge of sociocultural 
customs, practices, and communal issues that are requisites to 
solving community-wide social problems like domestic abuse.  
This knowledge creates the potential for social integration, 
reconciliation of cultural identity issues for new and second-
generation immigrants, as well as constructive outlets for resolving 
the conflation between cultural customs and religious values that 
often perpetuates abusive cultural practices.  Finally, the MAT 
model demonstrates that the IICJ has the potential to provide an 
efficient dispute resolution method, both in terms of time and 
money, which alleviates the stresses of adversarial litigation from 
individuals and their personal relationships. 
Opponents‘ concerns about the IICJ are valid when one only 
considers surface observations about the IICJ‘s constituents.  
However, an institution like the IICJ, equipped with the 
appropriate procedures and best practices of the MAT, presents an 
option for religious arbitration in Ontario that would not only 
circumvent these concerns, but would address paternalistic 
sociocultural trends and problems within the Muslim community 
and be a unifying force in Ontario. 
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